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I. INTRODUCTION

The odd system for choosing the American President has been defended
by a supposed federalism inherent in the electoral college.' These assertions
of federalism have not been given the scrutiny they deserve, however, even
after the controversial election of 2000, in which more Americans voted for
Al Gore, yet the electoral college chose George W. Bush.2 As the 2004
election approaches, I argue that today's electoral system serves no purpose of
realfederalism, through which states would exercise independent sovereignty.
* Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law, Tampa Bay, Florida. J.D., B.A.,
University of Virginia; LL.M, Georgetown University.
1. See, e.g., JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A
DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1971); ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM (1994). The term
"Electoral College" is not used in the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amend. XII (the
constitutional provisions setting forth the electoral system for choosing the President). Indeed, the
Constitution specifies that the electors must vote in their home states, not in a common gathering. Id.
amend. XII. The term "college" also means a group that serves a common purpose. It is this
meaning that today serves, perhaps unfortunately, as the most common term for the electoral system
for choosing the U.S. President. Because the term "college" is merely a colloquial reference and not
a formal designation, I use the term "electoral college" without initial capital letters.
2. The consequences of the extremely close 2000 presidential election have been enormous,
considering the momentous events of the George W. Bush administration. The major issues of the
2000 election, conducted during a period of peace and prosperity, concerned things such as a socalled "lock box" for the Social Security system and prescription drug benefits. See, e.g., Editorial,
Missed Chance, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Sept. 26, 2000, at A10 (discussing the "hot-button" issues of
2000). The administration of President Bush, by contrast, has concentrated largely on foreign
affairs-a change necessitated by the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the consequent American
military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the straining of American relations with many of our
allies. It will forever remain uncertain whether President Gore would have made the same choices
that President Bush did.
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Rather, today's electoral college allows for at best a meager federalism, in
which states are merely addresses in the national government.
Although the Constitution allows states to choose electors in any manner,
all states use popular voting.
Contrary to the expectations of the
constitutional framers of 1787, today's electors do not exercise independent
judgment; rather, they operate as mere automatons, controlled by the political
parties to whom they are bound. Although states are assigned by formula a
varying number of electors, small states receive at best only small boosts in
their voting power. And contrary to the assertions of some federalists, the
electoral system does not avoid the possibility of a "regional" winner; in fact,
the electoral system enhances the troubling prospect (which arguably has
already occurred at least once in American history) of a President supported
by only a minority of voters, in a minority of states.
Shorn of a defense of real federalism, there is no persuasive reason for the
United States to retain a system that leaves the choice of the American
President to formulaic chance.3 Applying a presumption that American
elections should be decided by direct popular vote unless there is a compelling
reason to follow another method, I conclude that the United States should
jettison its outmoded electoral college in favor of a more straightforward
direct popular vote.
II. TODAY'S ELECTORAL COLLEGE

A. The Constitution
The United States Constitution sets forth many, but not all, of the rules for
electing the President. Article II, addressing the executive, creates a system
of special presidential electors. 4 The first step is the appointment of electors:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and

3. This is of course not the first argument for disposing of the electoral college. In 1967, the
American Bar Association recommended that a direct popular vote replace the college. See AM. BAR
ASS'N, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT: A REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 3
(1967). Many other commentators have criticized the college, often through an argument that the
college creates a bias in favor of some group or region. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Electoral College
Reform: Dejii Vu, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 993 (2001); Joy McAfee, Should the College Electors Finally
Graduate? The ElectoralCollege: An American Compromisefrom Its Inception to Election 2000, 32
CuMB. L. REV. 643 (2001); John Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A MathematicalAnalysis of the

Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968). My approach differs in that I focus on scrutinizing
the putative federalist arguments for retaining the electoral college.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II.
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Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.",5 Thus in
2004, California has fifty-five electoral votes (by virtue of its two senators
and, after recalculation under the 2000 census, fifty-three representatives),
while seven states, plus the District of Columbia, have only three votes (by
virtue of their two senators and only one representative).6 Although states
appear to be free to choose any method of appointment, all states choose their
electors through a popular vote, with universal suffrage. 7 Article II also
authorizes Congress to "determine the Time of chusing the Electors," which
we now call Election Day in November.8
From this point, the electoral procedures are governed by the Twelfth
Amendment, 9 adopted in 1804 after the near-debacle of 1800, in which
Thomas Jefferson nearly lost the presidency to Aaron Burr through a flaw in
the original balloting method.10 On a day specified by Congress, the electors
5. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The clause also prohibits any federal official from serving as an elector.
See id.
6. See WORLD ALMANAC 606 (2004). The least populous states are, in reverse order of
population, Wyoming, Vermont, North Dakota, Alaska, South Dakota, Delaware, and Montana.
While Wyoming has about only 500,000 persons, there are more than 35 million Californians. Id. at
374 (2002 census bureau figures). The Eighteenth Amendment, ratified in 1961, gives the District of
Columbia the same number of electoral votes as the least populous state. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVIII. Although the District of Columbia held more people than 11 states in 1960, today only
Wyoming has fewer people. WORLD ALMANAC, supra,at 374.
7. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 45, 100 (no state has chosen its electors by a method other
than popular vote since 1876). The otherwise unfettered power of the states to "appoint" the electors
in the manner directed by the state legislature is hindered somewhat by Congress's power to specify
the "Time of chusing" the electors. Because Congress chooses the election day, a state legislature
apparently would not be able to hold, say, a week-long vote for electors or to direct that the electors
be a specified category of persons, such as a list of state officials or the state's most senior judges.
The time restriction apparently does not, however, require that electors be chosen by popular vote.
The Constitution would seem to permit choosing the electors, for example, by vote of the state
legislature (the most common method before 1824), by lottery, or by requiring them to compete in a
physical contest on the day of "chusing." See YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL
ATLAS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 30 (2001).

8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Congress has chosen a Tuesday in November as the day for
appointing electors, which we call Election Day. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
10. This flaw was revealed by the rise in political parties. As originally adopted, Article II
called for each elector "to vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an
inhabitant of the same State" as the elector. The person with a majority of votes was elected
President; the person who finished second became Vice President. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. With the rise
of political parties, however, many electors dedicated to a particular party began to use their two
votes to vote for two candidates of their party, in hope of electing both President and Vice President.
In the election of 1800, the electors for the winning Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas
Jefferson and Aaron Burr voted so uniformly that Burr ended up with the same number of votes as
Jefferson. Under Article II, the tie vote was then sent to the House of Representatives for selection.
The ambitious and crafty Burr tried to wrest the election from Jefferson. After a number of ballots,
Jefferson finally prevailed in the House. Burr became Vice President. The efforts against Burr of
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The votes are not

officially tallied on that date, however; they are transmitted from the states to2
the nation's Capitol, where they are counted before the assembled Congress.
A person receiving a majority of electoral votes is elected President.' 3 If no
candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes-something that has
happened only once since 1800, in the election of 182414-the election shifts
to the House of Representatives, which votes state by state, among the three

candidates with the highest electoral tallies, 1for
as many ballots as necessary
5
until a candidate garners a majority of states.

New York's Alexander Hamilton, a Federalist, stirred up existing bad blood between the two
statesmen. When Hamilton later took steps to prevent Burr from being elected governor of New
York, Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel, in which Burr shot and killed the first secretary of the
Treasury. For a short but evocative history of the Burr-Hamilton dispute, see ROBERT ELLIS,
FOUNDING BROTHERS (1999); see also MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 21-22. The Twelfth
Amendment specified that the electors must vote "in distinct ballots" for President and Vice
President. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
11. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating that Congress specifies the day for the electors to
vote); id. amend. XII (stating that electors vote in their respective states).
12. Id. amendXII.
13. Id.
14. By 1824, the two-party system had temporarily weakened (with the collapse of the
Federalist Party), and four candidates gathered nationwide support. Andrew Jackson, hero of the
Battle of New Orleans at the end of the War of 1812 (actually, after the war ended), received the
highest percentage of both the nationwide popular vote (43.1%) and the electoral vote (37.9%),
drawing well in every region except New England. John Quincy Adams, son of the second president
and better connected to mainstream politics, finished second in both the popular vote (30.5%) and the
electoral vote (32.2%), winning the New England states and most of the electors of New York, then
the nation's most populous state. Both William H. Crawford (13.2% and 15.7%), a southerner and
the sitting Treasury Secretary, and Henry Clay (13.5% and 14.2%), popular in the West, also won
state popular votes and electors. Because no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes, the
election shifted to the House of Representatives, which voted state by state among the top three
electoral vote-getters, pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment. Clay, who did not trust the hot-tempered
and untested Jackson, encouraged his congressional supporters in the West to vote for Adams. The
New Englander won on the first ballot, with thirteen states to Jackson's seven (Crawford took four).
Thus, Jackson became the first candidate to win the most popular votes but lose the election-an
event that occurred again in 1876, 1888, and 2000. He also remains the only candidate to receive the
most electoral votes but lose the election. Jackson's supporters alleged that he was the victim of a
"corrupt bargain" between Adams and Clay, whom the new President chose as secretary of state.
Jackson got his revenge against Adams in 1828, however, when he was overwhelmingly elected to
the first of two terms. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 247 (1944); MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 29-31.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. If the House of Representatives fails to elect a President by
inauguration day, which is now January 20, the Vice President-elect becomes President. If no Vice
President has been elected by January 20 (with today's party system, it is likely that a deadlock for
the presidency would also deadlock the vice presidential vote), Congress is authorized to choose the
President by an alternative method of selection-a dilemma that the United States has never
encountered. See id. amends. XII, XX.
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B. 1787's Choice of an Electoral College
The electoral college was the brainchild of the constitutional convention
of 1787. Over the course of a sweltering late spring and summer, behind
closed doors and windows (the flies were annoying and the snoops were
worrisome), delegates from the thirteen states 16 used a mild mandate to
consider amendments to the Articles
of Confederation to draft an entirely new
17
Constitution for the United States.
Because the convention did not keep an official record of the debate, our
most reliable evidence of the thoughts of the delegates comes from the notes
of Virginia's James Madison,' 8 whose thorough preparation and thoughtful
comments gave him an outsized role in crafting the Constitution. 19 Compared
with the contentious and lengthy debate over the representation of states in the
Congress, which occupied much of the summer, 20 an exhausted convention
spent relatively little time debating the election of the chief executive.
According to Madison, the election of the President was debated during
snippets of time on June 1 and 2, for longer periods but intermittently from
July 17-26, and finally resolved, after a committee report, following an
intense debate on September 4-7, 1787.21
What is most striking about the limited debate was the dominance of one
position-a distrust of the "people" to elect the President. As famously put by
Virginia's George Mason, election by the people would be as "unnatural" as
"to refer a trial of colours to a blind man." 22 Although a number of prominent
delegates at the convention spoke in favor of popular election-including
Madison, Pennsylvania's Benjamin Franklin and James Wilson, New York's

16. Or rather, twelve states; Rhode Island refused to send any delegates See CHARLES L. MEE,
JR., THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 53-54 (1987).
17. For a thoughtful but entertaining popular history of the 1787 Convention, see id.
18. See THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON (Guillard Hunt & James

Brown Scott eds., 1920) [hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES].
19. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 30-34 (1982) (discussing
Madison's leading role).
20. Resolution of the debate included the compromise between large and small states over the
different rules for representation in the Senate and the House of Representatives and the compromise
between North and South, resulting in the decision to count a slave as 3/5 of a person. See MEE, JR.,
supra note 16, at 213-25.
21. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 40-43, 267-325, 506-31.
22. Id. at 269 (July 17). Mason's era was insensitive to insults based on physical disability.
Interestingly, an insult using similar imagery was slung against President George W. Bush in 2003 by
his former Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, in a bestselling biography. See JAMES SUSKIND, THE
PRICE OF LOYALTY (2003) (asserting that at a Cabinet meeting, Bush "was like a blind man in a
roomful of deaf people").
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Gouverneur Morris, and Maryland's Charles Carroll 23-the
preliminary
debates in June and July showed widespread opposition to having the people
chose the President.24
To twenty-first century sensibilities, the arguments against popular
election seem jarring. First, delegates argued that "the people" simply were
not qualified to vote for the chief executive. Continuing his analogy of the
people to a disability, Mason argued that the common man lacked the
"capacity" to assess a presidential candidate.
Massachusetts's Elbridge
Gerry, one of the convention's most active speakers, asserted that the general
populace was uninformed and that it was a "radically vicious" idea to elect the
President through the "ignorance of the people. 2 6
Roger Sherman, a former cobbler and one of the few delegates to have
risen from the ranks of the common man, argued that citizens would be likely
to vote for persons from their own states, with the result that no one would
receive a majority of votes. 27 Fellow Connecticut delegate Oliver Ellsworth,
as aristocratic as Sherman was not, warned that the propensity to vote for a
local candidate would ensure that large states would elect the President 8-a
concern that is still voiced to some extent by today's "federalist" opponents of
direct election. 29 Even Madison agreed with Sherman and Ellsworth, but
added that home-state voting would not necessarily favor all big states, in part
because there were fewer qualified voters under the restrictive franchises of
large southern states.3a Madison was surely referring to his state of Virginia,
by far the nation's most populous state, in which a majority of adults were
disenfranchised because they were enslaved or did not meet property
31
qualifications.

23. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 40 (Wilson, June 1), 267 (Morris, July 17), 320
(Madison, July 24), 325 (Franklin, July 26), 461 (Carroll, Aug. 24). Franklin was 81 years old in
1787 and spoke much less often than he had at conventions in the past. By contrast, his colleague,
Judge Wilson, was one of the more active speakers. Although Morris has been overshadowed by
Madison in history as a craftsman of the Constitution, it was Morris who apparently drafted the bulk
of the actual words of the Constitution. See generally RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN
REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
24. See MADISON'S NOTES, supranote 18, at 40-325.
25. Id.at 269 (July 17).
26. Id.at 286 (July 19), 323 (July 25).
27. Id.at 267 (July 17).
28. Id. at 320 (July 25); see also id. at 268 (Pinckney, July 17).
29. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 8, 13-14 (arguing that the electoral college provides
protections for smaller states).
30. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 320 (July 25).
31. In recent years, scholars have suggested that the electoral college was selected in part in
order to preserve the power of the slave-owning states, which had relatively few voters for their
population, but which were given electors on the basis of their population as represented in Congress,
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Even more intriguing was the concern that the people would be swayed by
"active & designing men," as asserted by South Carolina's Charles
Pinckney.32 To the eighteenth century delegates, it would have been improper
for a gentleman to have actively "run" for office; gentlemen were supposed to
wait for support to build around them. 3 Even more disturbing was Gerry's
suggestion that the people would be "subject to delusion., 34 Blunt-speaking
Mason finally made clear a concern that apparently was on the minds of many
delegates:
"[A] popular election in any form... would throw the
appointment into the hands of the [Society of the] Cincinnati," the prominent
club of former Revolutionary officers.35 A motion by Carroll to elect the
President by the "people" was defeated by a 9-2 vote of states on August 24
(only Pennsylvania and Delaware voted yea).3 6 Apparently because of the
depth of the preliminary opposition to the idea, popular election was hardly
mentioned when the convention reconsidered the presidency in earnest in
37
early September.
In addition to popular election, delegates discussed at various times four
alternatives for selecting the President: (1) by state legislatures, (2) by state
executives, (3) by special electors, or (4) by the Congress.3 8 Interestingly, the
first choice to collect widespread support was election by the "National
Legislature" (later named "the Congress"), proposed on June 1 by Roger
Sherman. 39 The delegates tentatively approved this method the next day, and

which the convention had already decided was to be determined using enslaved persons as 3/5 of a
free person. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, HISTORY, SLAVERY, SEXISM,
THE SOUTH, AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (2001) (arguing that giving power to slave-owning
states was a chief reason for the college); GARRY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE
SLAVE POWER (2003) (noting that the "slave vote" assisted in getting Jefferson elected in 1800).
32. Id.at 268 (July 17).
33. See, e.g., MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 18 (stating that eighteenth century candidates did
not campaign personally).
34. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 323 (July 25).
35. Id.at 325 (July 26). Named for the Roman general Cincinnatus and today known primarily
for its old collection of military memorabilia in Washington, D.C., the Society of the Cincinnati was
in 1787 a powerful, and to many ominous, force in society. Using a somewhat reluctant George
Washington as its standard bearer in 1787, the Cincinnati had recently proposed passing its
membership to first sons, which struck some as holding the potential for creating an American
aristocracy. At a time in which the experiment in representative democracy was far from certain of
success, a powerful and hereditary private organization of military officers appeared to be a serious
threat to democracy. See MEE, JR., supra note 16, at 48-50, 205-06.
36. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 461. A number of votes at the convention did not
include all the states because at various times some states did not have any delegates present.
37. See id. at 509-31.
38. See id.at 324 (Mason's summary, July 26).
39. Id.at 40 (June 1).
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then moved on to debate the executive's powers and limitations.4 °
It was James Wilson, who had failed to gather support for popular
election, who first mentioned on June 2 the idea of selecting the President by
"Electors." 41 Ironically, for today's federalist defense of the electoral college,
Wilson's idea was to divide the nation up into special, nationally drawn
electoral districts, in order to avoid "intervention of the States. '42 His idea
support, however, and was voted down in favor of election by
gathered little
43
Congress.
When the convention returned to the topic of the President on July 17, the
delegates had just completed their exhausting and nearly destructive debate
over representation in Congress. 44 Finally able to focus on the executive,
many delegates expressed serious reservations over the tentative plan to have
the Congress choose the President. Gouverneur Morris, who supported
election by the people, warned that congressional choice would make the
President a "creature of the Legisl[ature]," and that the selection process
would be subject to the work "of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction," like the
elections of certain European leaders, as well as cardinals and popes.45 After
Maryland's Luther Martin proposed to have the state legislatures choose the
President, 46 Ellsworth mentioned briefly the idea of state-appointed electors
(the eventual choice, of course),47 which was initially approved but then
48
reconsidered because of its apparent expense.
After the convention returned again to a tentative consensus on selection
by the Congress, 49 prominent delegates once again found fault with the plan.
Wilson tried and failed again with yet another alternative-picking the
President by lot from the Congress.50 More disturbing was the prediction of
Madison that selection by Congress would be subject to foreign interference,
as with the history of election of the Holy Roman Emperor.5' In a crucial
40. Id. at 43 (June 2).
41. Id. at 41-42 (June 2).
42. Id.
43. See id.at 42 (vote after criticism by Gerry and North Carolina's Hugh Williamson).
44. See MEE, JR., supra note 16, at 231-30.
45. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 267 (July 17).
46. Id. at 270 (July 17).
47. Id. at 286 (July 19).
48. See id. at 287 (vote on July 19), 294 (reconsideration on July 20), 310-11 (reconsideration
on July 24).
49. Id. at 313 (July 24).
50. Id. at 317 (July 24).
51. Id. at 319 (July 25). The Holy Roman Empire, which as the saying went was neither holy,
Roman, nor an empire, was a loose federation of central European states, mostly German-speaking,
that lasted in various forms for centuries, until Napoleon finally did away with it. See PETER H.
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moment, Madison then expressed support for the idea of electors, as an
alternative to his first choice of popular election, and as a better method than
selection by the Congress. 52 Unlike Congress, which would be susceptible to
"cabal"-Madison was surely thinking of the political "parties" that
controlled English politics-electors could be forced to meet immediately
53
after their selection, thus giving them no time to scheme or combine.
Madison's logic appears to have made some headway; South Carolina's
Pierce Butler, who rarely spoke, agreed that an electoral system was a way to
avoid "cabal" at home and "intrigue" from abroad.54 The next day, July 26,
however, after long debates on whether the President should be impeachable
and whether he should serve a short or long term, George Mason moved to
conclude the discussion with a vote on selecting the executive through the
Congress, and it was again approved, 7-3.55
The delegates did not return to the presidency for nearly a month, as the
convention moved to the process of turning broad ideas into details, which
57
was largely handled by committee.5 6 One committee of eleven delegates
was charged with making a report on the details of the constitutional
provisions on the presidency. 8 A record of the committee's work would have
been fascinating, as its eleven members included Madison, Morris, and
Carroll, each of whom spoke in favor of popular election, as well as Sherman,
Williamson, and Butler. Alas, we have no contemporaneous record of the
committee's deliberations before it reported to the convention on September
4.59

Despite the earlier votes in favor of election by the Congress, the
committee proposed that the President be chosen by electors, selected by the
states, who would meet and vote in their respective states.6 ° If a majority of
electors did not agree, the election would be shifted to the Senate. 61 This
report, coming near the end of the demanding summer, appears to have
WILSON, THE HOLY ROMAN EMTIRE: 1495-1806 (1999).

52. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 319-20 (July 25). Madison's notes are especially
detailed on this statement.
53. See id. at 320 (July 25).
54. See id. at 321 (July 25).
55. See id. at 326 (July 26).
56. See MEE, JR., supra note 16, at 237-60.
57. As of August 25, 1787, it appeared that the committee was following the plan to have the
Congress choose the President. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 461-63 (including
statement by New York's James Livingston, Aug. 25).
58. See id.at 496-502 (Aug. 31).
59. See id at 506-07 (Sept. 4).
60. Id. (Sept. 4).
61. Id. at 507 (Sept. 4).
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resolved the matter in favor of an electoral system; the delegates hardly
touched the merits of the plan to use electors.6 2 The most extensive
explanation for the choice of electors came from Morris, who emphasized that
having electors vote in their own states would free the President from
congressional control and, most significantly, would avoid the "intrigue,"63
"faction," and "cabal" that would be fostered by a congressional vote.
Morris did not contend that an electoral system would preserve power in the
states.
Using Morris's argument as a cue, Madison then directed the delegates to
a perceived flaw in the electoral proposal. Madison assumed that in most
elections no candidate would receive a majority of electoral votes, thus
leading to election of President by the Senate.64 Madison's prediction about
the ineffectiveness of the electors was echoed by a number of prominent
speakers, including Mason, who guessed that the Senate would end up
electing the President nineteen times in twenty.65 Pinckney also agreed,
arguing that electors would be ignorant of qualified candidates from across
the nation; he complained that the Senate would hold both the power to
impeach and, effectively, the power to elect.6 6 Georgia's Abraham Baldwin
agreed that electors would often be ignorant, but suggested that this might
change as the nation progressed.67 No delegate spoke to disagree with
Madison's prediction that the electors typically would fail to elect the
President.68
This assumption helps undermine an argument that the
convention chose an electoral college in order to achieve a delicate balance
between state and national power. What the delegates did not predict, of
course, was the rise of national political parties.69
Complaints continued to surface. Wilson and Edmund Randolph, who
had set forth the "Virginia Plan" that formed the foundation for the
62. See id at 506-31 (Sept. 4-7).
63. Id. at 509 (Sept. 4).

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 510 (Sept. 4).
67. Id.
68. The most notable exception was the comment of Morris that, if electors voted for two
persons, a single candidate might gain a vote from a majority of electors. Id. at 515 (Sept. 5).
Madison apparently disagreed that two votes would solve the problem of divided electors and
proposed that the requirement for election be reduced to one-third of the electors-a proposal that
was voted down on Sept. 5, 1787. See id. at 516 (Sept. 5). Eventually, the convention adopted
Morris's proposal for giving each elector two votes. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (superceded by
U.S. CONST. amend. XII). As it turned out, the rise of national political parties meant that collecting
a majority of electors proved to be no problem, except for 1824 and the near-disaster of the election
of 1800. See supranote 14.
69. See infra Part II.D.
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Constitution, criticized selection by the Senate as leaning towards
"aristocracy., 70 Gerry proposed that the President be ineligible for reelection,
thus giving the executive some measure of independence from the Senate.7'
Mason rejected the entire idea of Senate election, which he said would lead to
an "absolute monarchy"; the ever-irascible Virginian suggested instead that
the executive should consist of seven or eight men, as in Prussia.72 Despite
the grumbling over the plan to refer the election to the Senate, the convention
then approved on September 6 by a 9-2 vote the electoral method for
choosing the President-the critical decision that was being overshadowed by
the debate over the Senate's role.73
Offering an alternative to Senate referral, North Carolina's Richard Dobbs
Spaight proposed that the electors meet and vote until they reached a majority
choice.74 In the minds of the delegates, such a plan would have enhanced
tremendously the power of the electoral college. Because it would have given
state-chosen electors the power to negotiate, it also raised the specter that such
power would encourage "intrigue" and "cabal." Spaight's idea was quickly
voted down 11-1, clarifying for good that indecision in the electoral college
would be resolved by the Congress. 7
Noting the widespread dissatisfaction over the proposed role of the
"aristocratic" Senate, Roger Sherman came to the rescue. Late in the day of
September 6, Sherman floated an idea that referral be made to the more
egalitarian House of Representatives. 76 Anticipating the likely objections
from smaller states that their power would be diminished by use of the House,
Sherman clarified that the presidential vote in the House could be conducted
state by state. 77 In this way, the House vote would resemble a Senate voteeach state would have an equal "say"-but the voting would done by the more
democratically oriented House representatives.78 The convention quickly
rallied behind Sherman's compromise solution and approved it, 10-1.79
70. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 516 (Sept. 5), 519 (Sept. 6).
71. Id.at 518-19 (Sept. 6).
72. Id.at 518 (Sept. 5).
73. Only the two Carolinas voted against the plan. Id.at 521-22 (Sept. 6).
74. Id.at 522 (Sept. 6).
75. Id.
76. Id.at 523 (Sept. 6).
77. Id.
78. The assumption that the Senate and the House would consist of different categories of
men-the Senate would be state-legislature-chosen gentry, while the House would be more
democratically elected commoners-was an eighteenth century idea that would be dissolved nearly
entirely with the Seventeenth Amendment, which directed in 1913 that senators be elected by popular
vote. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
79. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 523 (Sept. 6). Only Delaware voted nay. Id.
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Thus the convention resolved what came to be known as the "electoral
college" system for choosing the President, with referral to the House in the
case that no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes. 80 The delegates
did not revisit the matter before approving the completed Constitution and
adjourning on September 17, 1787.81 The final significant assessment was
made by Madison, however, on September 7. Referring to the frequently
expressed viewpoint that the electoral system would usually result in selection
of the President by a branch of Congress, Madison complained:
He thought it an evil that so small a number at any rate should be
authorized, to elect. Corruption would be greatly facilitated by it. The
mode itself was liable to this further weighty objection that the
representatives of a Minority of the people, might reverse the choice
of a majority of the States and of the people.82
This was said on September 7, 1787, not November 7, 2000.83
C. The OriginalIntent and Today
In assessing the work of the constitutional convention, hindsight reveals a
number of changes in society and politics that the. delegates did not anticipate.
First, the assumption that the people are too ignorant to directly elect the
President strikes modem sensibilities as un-American. But of course even
relative democrats in the eighteenth century were skeptical of too much
democracy. 84 This was an age when the historical experiments with republics,
80. The final issue to receive significant debate was the addition of a requirement that at least
two-thirds of the states vote in a House referral. See id. at 526 (Sept. 7).
81. Although most delegates accepted the compromises in the final Constitution, a few leading
figures refused, including Virginia's Mason and Randolph and Massachusetts's Gerry. Mason
complained vigorously that the Constitution would result in the creation of an aristocratic
government, far removed from the people. See MEE, JR., supra note 16, at 272-76. Mason's
objections helped kindle the fight for an addition of amendments, in the form of a "bill of rights" to
protect the people from the overreaching of government. See BURNS, supra note 19, at 42-43, 9091. Mason's achievements-from drafting Virginia's revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man
in early 1776, which influenced his young fellow Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, a few months later in
Philadelphia-to reminding the 1787 delegates of the virtues of the common person, to his advocacy
of the bill of rights' protection of individuals rights-make him easily the most overlooked and
underrated founder. See HELEN HILL MILLER, GEORGE MASON, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY
(1975).
82. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 526 (Sept. 7).
83. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ordering a halt to the Florida recount of the popular
vote for President, thus ensuring that Bush would win an electoral college majority, despite Gore's
gathering more popular votes on November 7, 2000).
84. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 19, at 30-36 (noting the framers' belief in republican
institutions but skepticism of unfettered democracy); MEE, JR., supra note 16, at 106-16 (discussing
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such as ancient Greece, seemed unstable, and this was an age when many
Americans were illiterate and knew little of national politics. 85 Despite the
original prominence of the "ignorance" argument, however, today's federalist
supporters of the electoral college do not focus on this rationale, for obvious
86

reasons.

Fears of foreign intrigue or undue influence by groups such as the Society
of the Cincinnati likewise seem quaint. The delegates of 1787 did not know
that the United States would rise from being a breakaway outpost of European
civilization to a great world power, or that the American political system
would prove to be among the best in history in avoiding military influence
over the government.
Only one argument voiced in the constitutional convention continues to be
expressed by today's defenders of the electoral college-the concern that
large states might hold an outsized influence on the election if the President
were chosen by a popular vote. 87 But even on this point the eighteenth
century concerns seem anachronistic. For the most part, the convention's
delegates feared that large states would benefit from popular election because
the people in large states would typically vote for candidates from their own
states88 _a concern that few if any would raise today. In fact, even in the
summer of 1787 the fear of dominance by large states was questioned. In
response to Pinckney's warning that popular election would result in "active
& designing men" from large states swaying the people, 89 Morris pointed out
a flaw in the logic. How could the thousands of people of various large states
combine and negotiate? 90 Choosing the President through a smaller body of
persons would be much more susceptible to intrigue, he countered. 9 1
Indeed, the fear that large states could form a bloc to choose a single
presidential candidate-a concern related to the congressional representation
some of 1787's skepticism of democracy).
85. See, e.g., SAMUEL ELLIOT MORISON ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY FOR THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE 99-100 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the rise of democracy as an idea in eighteenth century

America).
86. The "ignorance" argument today repels most Americans, especially after other institutions,
such as the U.S. Senate, have been democratized. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Even more
significantly, today's presidential electors do not exercise any independent judgment-which was a
primary reason for choosing the electoral system over a popular vote to begin with.
87. See, e.g., MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 267 (Sherman, July 17), 268 (Pinckney,
July 17). Professor Hardaway has made the protection of small states a focus of his federalist
defense of the college. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 8, 13-14.
88. See, e.g., MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 267 (Sherman, July 17), 268 (Pinckney,
July 17), 319 (Madison, July 25).
89. Id. at 268 (July 17).
90. See id.
91. Id.
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issue that riled the convention for weeks92-seems misguided. As events
unfolded, the two largest states for most of the eighteenth century, Virginia
and Massachusetts, would rarely agree on anything, much less on a joint
course of action contrary to the joint desires of small states such as New
Hampshire and Georgia. Ever perceptive, Madison tried to quell the fears of
small-state delegates by predicting correctly that the primary division of the
United States would not be between large and small states, but between
northern and southern ones-a divide grounded in the disagreement over
slavery, which eventually would rip the nation apart in 1861. Nonetheless,
the fear that direct election of the President would give undue influence to
large states-or rather, would take away the special influence supposedly
given to small states by the electoral college-forms a foundation for today's
federalist defenses.94
D. PoliticalPartiesand the Electoral College
Political parties are the most significant aspect of the electoral system not
addressed by the framers of 1787. Indeed, the party system stands like a silent
colossus over the Constitution's written political structure. Most of the
eighteenth century rationales for the electoral college have been rendered
irrelevant by the rise of parties and laws generated by modem partisan
politics.
The convention did not mention parties in their Constitution because, of
course, they hoped to avoid what they viewed as the "factions" and "cabals"
that infected the politics of Great Britain and that led to "intrigue" and
"corruption." 95 In retrospect, their hopes of avoiding partisanship in favor of
civic-minded individualism seem naive. After 1787, persons of like minds
quickly grouped into opposing camps under the consensus first President,
George Washington. 96 By the election of Washington's successor in 1796, the
camps had solidified into two parties-the Federalist Party and DemocraticRepublican Party. 97 Viewing the merchant-oriented Federalists as the

92. See MEE, JR., supra note 16, at 143-231.
93. See id. at 195.
94. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 8, 13-14, 79-83.
95. See, e.g., MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 267 (Morris, July 17), 319 (Madison, July
25), 321 (Butler, July 25), 323 (Gerry, July 25), 324 (Mason, July 26), 463 (Morris, Aug. 24), 509
(Morris, Sept. 4), 515 (Mason, Sept. 5).
96. See BEARD & BEARD, supra note 14, at 142-53; MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 13-19.
97. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 13-16. The Federalist Party, which favored a strong
central government, was skeptical of democracy, and gathered most of its support from the North and
among the merchant class. The Democratic-Republican Party, which distrusted central authority,
was more egalitarian and was strongest in the South and among farmers. See id.
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precursor to today's Republican Party, the basic split between the businessand the common-person's Democratic Party
friendly Federalists/Republicans
98
remains as firm today as ever.
Party politics quickly obliterated the original conception of the electoral
college as a body of men who, through their personal knowledge and
judgment, would independently choose the President among qualified
Americans.99 By 1808, both the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans
nominated party candidates through congressional caucuses held well in
advance of the "election day" on which electors were chosen. 00 By 1824,
most states decided to choose their electors through popular vote-a practice
that is universal today. 0 1 The vote for electors thus became a choice among
the parties,with electors being merely the conduit. Today, most voters do not
even see the name of the electors on their ballots; they vote for the party
candidates. The winning candidate in each state is rewarded by having
electors pledged to him or her named to the "college."' 0 2 Accordingly, the
vote of the electoral college in December 0 3 quickly lost its drama. The key
votes in today's system are the parties' nomination of a candidate, decided in
summer conventions after primaries and caucuses, 10 4 and the November
98. To be sure, the Democratic Party, which elected as its first President Thomas Jefferson,
who idealized the common farmer, has not always been friendly to the common man. In the
nineteenth century, the Democratic Party in the South was dominated by aristocratic, slave-owning
planters (so-called to distinguish themselves from mere "farmers"), who were the primary impetus to
the states' seceding in the 1860s, leading to the Civil War. Not until the late 1960s did the
Democratic Party in most southern states include African Americans within its definition of the
electorate. See MORISON ET AL., supra note 85, at 326-37 (discussing the Democratic Party's
silencing of black Americans in the South).
99. See, e.g., MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 286 (in response to complaints over the
ignorance of the people, a proposal by Ellsworth on July 19, 1787, for a system of electors chosen by
the states); id.at 509 (Morris's explanation on Sept. 4 of the committee decision in favor of an
electoral system, largely to avoid "intrigue and faction").
100. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 24.
101. See id.at 29; HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 100 (discussing the universality of popular
elections after 1876). In the early days of the nation, many states chose their electors through vote of
the state legislature. See M1ECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 29. The switch to popular votes reflected a
move toward democratization in the early nineteenth century in American political philosophy.
While most states limited the franchise to property owners in the late 1700s, by the Civil War nearly
all states allowed all white males to vote. Wyoming was the first state to give women the right to
vote, in 1890, and the Nineteenth Amendment made this right universal in 1920. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX. African Americans were discouraged from voting in most southern states until after the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. See MORISON ET AL., supra note 85, at 731-34.
102. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 50 (discussing state laws that prohibit electors from
voting for a candidate other than the one to whom they were pledged).
103. Congress has specified that the electors vote on the first Monday after the second
Wednesday in December every four years. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
104. Democratization has also diminished the role of the party convention delegate. In the
1820s and 1830s, the parties abandoned congressional caucuses in favor of nominating conventions,
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"general election." Soon after 1787 the electoral college vote became, and
remains today, merely a formality.
The final indignity in diminishing the authority of the elector came in the
twentieth century, when some states adopted laws prohibiting the "faithless
elector"--an elector who bucks the party candidate to whom he or she is
pledged and votes for a different person. 0 5 Because of party loyalty, faithless
electors have been rare in recent history, even without laws tying them to their
candidate. 10 6 Thus in 2000, after resolution of the Florida controversy showed
Al Gore to be behind George W. Bush by just a handful of votes-271 to
267-it was unthinkable that any electors in Florida or any other state won by
Bush would switch to Gore.
The failure of the electoral college to serve as a forum for electors to
exercise their independent judgment would have surprised and disappointed
the framers of 1787. Many of the framers frankly expected that the loose
grouping of independent-minded electors, who vote for President in their
home states, would consistently result in electoral votes for a multitude of
potential Presidents. 0 7 This never occurred. The rise of party-aligned
electors was soon accompanied by state laws, now in place in every state but
Maine and Nebraska, granting the candidate winning the largest number of
popular votes all of the state's electors, regardless of the closeness of the
08
popular vote or whether the leading candidate has collected a majority.'
which to this day are held a few months before the general election. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note
7, at 29, 36. For more than a century, the state-chosen convention delegates exercised more
independence than the electors. Until fairly recently, multiple candidates, multiple balloting, and
"horse-trading" between ballots were commonplace in party presidential nominating conventions.
For example, Wendell Wilkie won the Republican nomination in 1940 as a "dark horse" who
emerged victorious only in the sixth ballot. See DoRIs KEARNS GOODWIN, No ORDINARY TIME 141
(1994). After the chaotic Democratic Party convention in Chicago in 1968, both parties took power
away from the delegates by nominating, for the most part, through popular primaries (which existed
in some states by 1968), a process that aligns delegates to one candidate before the convention, much
as the party system has aligned electors to candidates before the November general election. See
MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 12-22. Since 1972, the convention's nomination of the candidate
who won the most pledged delegates in the primaries has never been in doubt.
105. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 47, 50 (discussing some of the laws barring faithless
electors). Interestingly, Professor Hardaway, who defended the electoral college as representing a
federalist contract made in 1787, proposed a law to prevent faithless electors. See id. at 82, 164.
106. There were only a handful of faithless electors in the twentieth century and never more
than one in any election, with the exception of the split between Kennedy and Byrd among the
Alabama Democratic electors in 1960. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 80-149.
107. See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 18, at 267 (Gerry, July 17), 320 (Ellsworth, July 24),
268 (Pinckney, July 17).
108. See BEST, supra note 1, at 22-23 (discussing the near universality of the unit voting rule,
and the reasons that it is likely to remain); HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 49. Maine and Nebraska
assign electors by the separate tallies in each of their congressional districts. However, neither state
has ever cast electoral votes for more than one candidate. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 14-
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This so-called "unit" rule presumably gives parties greater power, but further
diminishes the idea of the electoral college as a diverse body of independent
thinkers. In only three elections in American history-the last in 1912-has a
person other than the nominees of the two leading parties received as much as
10% of the electoral votes. 0 9 Today, the only way to describe the role of an
elector is an automaton, who dutifully and mechanically carries out the wish
of the party and the state's popular vote.
Because political parties have obliterated the 1787 conception of the
independent elector, one might expect today's federalist defenders of the
college to lament the dominant role of the national parties. This is not the
case, however. Indeed, a leading federalist defender has asserted that an
important reason for retaining the college is to discourage challengers to the
two leading parties.' 0 Even if one accepts the assumption that the college
shores up the two-party system, it is problematic for a traditionalist to defend
the electoral college through a modem phenomenon-political parties-that
would have left the framers aghast.

III. THE FEDERALIST DEFENSES OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
Many defenders of today's electoral college argue that the college
constitutes a form of federalism-a governmental system in which power is
shared among the national and state governments. The federalist justification
has risen, I suggest, in large part because the college plainly fails to serve
most of the purposes for which it was established in 1787. The federalist
argument was also given resonance by the 2000 election, in which for the
fourth time in the nation's history the candidate who got the most popular
149. In a more urbanized and diverse state, such as California or New York, choosing electors
through congressional districts would certainly result in both major parties "winning" districts and
receiving electors. Under the unit voting rules, however, candidate A, receiving 35% of the popular
vote, edging candidate B, with 34%, or candidate C, with 31%, gets 100% of the state's electors.
109. The first instance, 1824, occurred because of the collapse of the Federalist Party and
divisions among the dominant Democratic-Republican Party. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at
29-31. The second was in 1860, on the cusp of the Civil War, when the Democratic Party split into
northern and southern factions. See id at 52-54. The third and final instance was in 1912, when
former President Theodore Roosevelt broke from the Republican Party and ran as a Progressive (also
called "Bull Moose") Party candidate and won 16.6% of the electoral votes, more than incumbent
Republican President William H. Taft, who carried only the 8 electoral votes of Vermont and Utah.
See id. at 85-87. None of the southern "states-rights" breakaway candidates from the Democratic
Party in the mid-twentieth century-Strom Thurmond in 1948, Harry Byrd in 1960, and George
Wallace in 1968-won as much as 10% of the electoral vote. See id. at 109, 117, 124. Recent
nationwide third choices-John Anderson in 1980 and Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996-won
substantial popular vote totals but no electoral votes. See id. at 133, 143, 146.
110. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 18-19. To be fair, Professor Hardaway disagreed that
the independence of electors was a primary motivation for the adoption of an electoral college
system. See id. at 85-86.
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votes lost the election through the college."' George W. Bush was aided in
2000 by the fact that he won a majority of the smaller states, which are given
a somewhat larger share of the electoral vote than their populations would
give them through a direct popular vote." 2 Some conservatives have even
maintained that this small bias-which may have turned the extraordinarily
close election of 2000-is a form of federalism that was brilliantly anticipated
and crafted by the 1787 delegates."13
In this part, I scrutinize the federalist justifications through three leading
advocates for the electoral college. First, the late Herbert J. Storing argued
that the college, although not purely "democratic," may serve important
values other than mere majoritarianism. Adjusting Storing's argument, I
contend that democracy should nonetheless form a "presumption" for any
representative election. Second, political scientist Judith Best has maintained
that the electoral college's formula avoids a "regional" President who might
be elected through a direct popular vote. I maintain that Best's assumptions
are invalid; indeed, it is the electoral college that is more susceptible to
electing a regional, minority President and that it has already done so. Third,
law professor Robert Hardaway has argued that the electoral college both
protects small states and serves to shore up the two-party system. Again, I
contend that these attributes are greatly overstated. The electoral college
serves no purpose of fostering real federalism that justifies diverging from the
presumption in favor of a democratic election.
A. Democracy, or a Presumption of Democracy?
The United States does not have a "simplistic democracy," Professor
Herbert J. Storing reminded us.' 14 Rather, we have a complex constitutional
system that includes divisions of authority, including "brakes" on our
government's response to the desires and whims of the majority. 15 By
"mitigat[ing]" the dominance of the majority democratic view, the framers of
1787 created a more stable form of government, Storing maintained." 6 The

111. See MIECZKOWSKI, supranote 7, at 30 (1824), 64 (1876), 72 (1888), 149 (2000).
112. See id. at 149.
113. See Dell Hunt, If It Ain't Broke... Don 't Fix It! (2001), availableat http://www.president
elect.org/arthunt aintbroke.html (last visited July 23, 2004).
114. HERBERT J. STORING, In Defense of the Electoral College, in TOWARDS A MORE PERFECT
UNION: WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING 395, 395 (Joseph M. Besette ed., 1995). Storing, who
passed away in 1997, taught political science for many years at the University of Chicago and the
University of Virginia. See id.
115. Seeid. at 395-96.
116. See id. at 396; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 156 (criticizing the appeal of a direct
popular election of the President as "simplistic" and holding a false "aura" of democracy).
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electoral college
is part of the framers' creation of a federal system of
17
government.'

Storing was undoubtedly correct in pointing out that the United States's
governmental system is not one of pure democracy. For the most part, our
national, state, and local governments are representativedemocracies, 118 or, to
a republic.'19

use a term that went out of fashion in the twentieth century,

With the rather rare exceptions of direct referenda, recall, and initiative-used

most

prominently

under

the

California

constitution

and

in

local

governmentsl2 -American citizens do not make decisions by direct vote, but

rather elect representatives who make decisions for them and who respond to
the citizens through frequent elections. Among the putative benefits of a
representative government are that elected leaders, unlike typical citizens,
have the time and inclination to analyze a problem thoroughly and rationally
before reaching a decision that is binding upon society. 121 Conceding that the

United States is not a pure democracy, most of our elected representatives are
nonetheless chosen directly by popular election. The national Congress is
elected by universal adult
suffrage, as are the legislatures of all the states and
22
all the state governors.'
Considering the nearly universal practice of electing representatives by
direct popular election, I suggest that the United States political system does
and should hold a presumption in favor of election by the people. 23 Applying
117. See STORING, supra note 114, at 396-97; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 83.
118. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I, II (vesting all national legislative and executive powers in a
democratically elected, representative Congress and President).
119. See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS (1863) (famously referring to
the United States as a "nation... of the people, by the people, [and] for the people").
120. See Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the
Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REv. 807 (2002) (discussing the nation's variety of
referendum and related laws); see also City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538
U.S. 188 (2003) (discussing the frequent practice of local governments submitting land-use decisions
to local referendum).
121. But see the film DR. STRANGELOVE (Columbia Films 1964), in which fictional U.S. Air
Force General Jack D. Ripper decides to start World War III himself because war "is too important to
be left to politicians," who "have neither the time, the training, nor the inclination for strategic
thought." On a more serious note, it is a good thing that our laws on protections of minority beliefs
were not subject to popular referenda on a day such as September 12, 2001.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (direct popular election of the House of Representatives),
amend. XV (no race discrimination in the right to vote), amend XVII (direct popular election of the
Senate, adopted in 1913), amend. XIX (women given the right to vote, nationwide), amend. XXIV
(no poll tax), amend. XXVI (extending the right to vote to all those 18 years of age or older,
nationwide).
123. The most notable example is the constitutional requirement of "one-person, one-vote," set
forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Applying the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal
protection" guarantee for citizens, Baker held that states could not draw legislative jurisdictions that
in effect gave a smaller number of citizens in certain regions a larger share of representatives than a

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[88:195

such a presumption to the presidency, the burden falls upon those who support
continuation of the electoral college to justify our continued reliance on an
indirect system of electors. Because most of the 1787 rationales for the
electoral system-ignorance of the citizenry, distrust of political parties, and
the desire for independent-minded electors-plainly no longer apply, the
presumption makes it incumbent upon the supporters of the electoral college
twenty-first century. Federalism has been placed at the
to defend it for the 124
defense.
the
of
front
B. Legitimacy?
Conceding that the electoral college does not work as the framers
intended, Professor Storing nonetheless argued that the electoral college
serves some goals that the framers desired to achieve, including a role for
The most significant of Storing's
state political organizations. 12 5
justifications, which I highlight here, is the defense of legitimacy-the
argument that the electoral system creates an outcome that appears to be more
clear-cut, and thus more legitimate, to the American people.
A complication of any electoral system is how to choose a winner when
no candidate receives a majority of votes. The "winner" becomes unclear
without a majority. With more than two candidates, the lack of a majority
winner is a real possibility--one candidate might receive, say, 40%, another
35%, and a third 25%.126 There are at least two ways to resolve this dilemma.
The first is to accept the plurality winner-the candidate with the most votes
wins, regardless of what percentage the candidate receives, and regardless of
the margin of victory. The second is to hold a "runoff' election between the
127
top two candidates, thus ensuring a majority winner in the second vote.
larger number of voters in other regions. See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)
(addressing the problem of political "gerrymandering" but refusing to order a change in districting as
long as each district has about the same number of voters). The electoral college cannot violate the
Constitution, of course, because it is part of it. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-4, amend. XII.
124. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 1; HARDAWAY, supra note 1; STORING, supra note 114 (all
defending the electoral college largely through the justification of federalism).
125. See STORING, supra note 114, at 398. The goals that Storing mentioned most prominently
were (1) fostering public participation, (2) stability, (3) providing a special role for certain
individuals, (4) giving power to the states, (5) establishing an independent President, and (6)
encouraging a good President. Id. Although Storing argued that the electoral college fosters state
political organizations, he did not elaborate on this proposition. See id. at 400.
126. This approach is followed by most states in electing governors and U.S. congressional
representatives. Because such systems allow for "minority" winners, they make third-party winners
more likely. Thus Minnesota elected third-party candidate Jesse Ventura to its governorship in 1998
with only 37% of the vote. See CNN, Election Results, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/1998/
states/MN/G/ (last visited July 23, 2004).
127. A number of states employ runoffs. Perhaps the most notable example of a runoff system
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The U.S. Constitution essentially follows a runoff system-when the electoral
college fails
to achieve a majority, the House acts as the runoff electoral
128
forum.
There should be no doubt that today's electoral college facilitates a
majority presidential winner in the first vote. Under the "unit" voting system
followed in nearly every state, a candidate receiving merely a plurality of
votes in the state is awarded all of the state's electors. Second-place or thirdplace finishes do not matter. The electoral college has failed to reach a
majority only twice-in 1800 and 1824-and not once since the solidification
of the modern two-party system. 29 By contrast, when the popular vote tally
among the top two finishers is close, the votes for third-party candidates may
deprive the plurality winner from getting a majority of the popular vote.
Indeed, in the past three presidential elections-1992, 1996, and 2000-no
candidate received 50% of the popular vote. 30
The college's facilitation of a majority winner in electoral votes makes
this winner more "legitimate," Storing argued. In the wake of the contentious
2000 election, on which Storing did not have the opportunity to comment,
however, the legitimacy argument for the electoral college seems rather
misguided. Although the electoral college makes a quick majority winner
more likely, it does not follow that this makes the winner more legitimate. If
we elected the President through a direct popular vote, the Constitution could
either accept a plurality winner who receives less than 50% of the vote, or
is the election of the French President, which almost always requires a runoff, considering the
multiplicity of parties in France. See Wikipedia, Runoff Voting, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Runoff voting (last visited July 11, 2004). A third approach to the problem of a lack of a majority
winner is to adopt a hybrid method, such as electing a plurality winner if the candidate receives a
certain percentage of the vote, such as 40% or 45%, and/or if the leading candidate has gained a
plurality by a certain margin of victory, say 5%, but to require a runoff if no candidate meets these
requirements.
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
129. Since the solidification of the Democratic/Republican two-party system around the Civil
War, a candidate other than the representative of these two parties has emerged as a plurality winner
in a state in only seven elections. First, Populist James B. Weaver carried a number of western states
in 1892. Second, former President Theodore Roosevelt broke from the Republican Party to run as a
Progressive Party candidate in 1912 and captured six states, as compared to the Republican
incumbent candidate William Howard Taft's two. Third, Progressive Party candidate Robert M.
Lafollette won his home state of Wisconsin in 1924. Fourth, breakaway Democrat Strom Thurmond,
opposing the pro-civil-rights plank of President Truman, won four southern states in 1948 as a
States' Rights candidate. Fifth, breakaway Democrat Harry Byrd won electoral votes in two states in
1960. Sixth, the final "boll-weevil" southern Democrat dissenter, George C. Wallace, carried five
states in 1968. The closest that any third-party candidate has come to winning a state since 1968 was
in 1992, when independent Ross Perot drew well in many states, especially New England, but failed
to win a plurality in any state. By contrast, the Democratic and Republican parties have won states in
every election since their formations. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 18-149.
130. See id. at 140-49.
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choose a runoff election. The former option is used by most states in electing
their governors, without engendering much controversy. 31 The runoff option,
while more complicated, allows voters to express more fully their preferences
among multiple candidates by voting twice-first in the preliminary round
32
among multiple candidates and then in the runoff between two candidates.
Some supporters of the electoral college further assume that the indirect
vote consistently makes the margin of victory wider and that a wider margin
appears more legitimate. 3 3 The election of 2000, however, should have put to
rest the assumption that the electoral college nearly always results in a wide
margin of victory.
Because of unit voting, electoral votes are awarded in blocks for each
state. 34 Wyoming is a block of three votes; California is a block worth fiftyfive votes. Because there are only fifty-one discrete blocks totaling 538
electoral votes,' 35 as opposed to a one-by-one tally of 100 million popular
votes,136 assembly of the blocks makes it less likely that the electoral vote will
end up close to dead-even, even when the nation's voters are split evenly
between the two parties. Even more significant is the "snowball" effect of the
electoral college vote. When a candidate's message resonates well enough
among voters of one state to give him or her a decent margin of the state's
popular vote-and thus all of its electoral votes-it is likely that the
candidate's success may be repeated in an adjoining state, and in another, and
in another.
Even moderate state margins thus often snowball into a large national
electoral vote victory. We often get "landslide" victories in the electoral
college, even though the popular vote margin has rarely been very wide. It is
a testament to the vigor of the two-party system that never in United States
history has a presidential candidate received as much as 62% of the popular
vote. 37 When the popular vote margin is moderate or wide, the snowball
131. Minnesota elected third-party candidate Jesse Ventura to its governorship in 1998 with
only 37% of the vote. See CNN, Election Results, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/1998/states
/MN/G/ (last visited July 23, 2004).
132. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 3, 14 (1994) (explaining some of
the benefits of multiple-choice voting).
133. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 1, at 123, 204; STORING, supra note 114, at 402.
134. See BEST, supra note 1, at 23-24 (explaining the unit voting system).
135. In addition to the fifty states, the District of Columbia has three electoral votes. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIII.
136. Slightly more than 105 million voters cast their ballots in 2000. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra
note 7, at 149.
137. Popular votes were not tallied nationwide until 1824. See id. at 30. The largest popular
vote share was Lyndon Johnson's 61% in 1964, see id. at 120; 61% is just slightly more than 3 of 5.
Johnson's electoral vote percentage (90.3%) was not as impressive as those of other "landslides"
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effect usually makes the electoral vote even wider; the electoral college in
effect magnifies the popular vote margin. Thus in 1936 Franklin Roosevelt
won 60.8% of the popular vote but 98.5% of the electoral vote, taking all but
two small states. 138 In 1984, Ronald Reagan gathered 58.8% of the popular
vote but 97.6% of the electoral vote, winning forty-nine states. 39 Even in
1996, when fewer than half (49.2%) of all American voters chose Bill Clinton
in a three-man race against40 Robert Dole and Ross Perot, Clinton carried
70.4% of the electoral vote. 1
The snowball effect has been so common that some commentators
assumed that the electoral college always magnifies the popular vote. 141 This
assumption was fed by the very close elections of 1960 and 1968. John
Kennedy gathered just an eyelash more popular votes than Richard Nixon in
1960 (49.7% to 49.6%), yet won the electoral college by a fair margin, 303 to
219 (though this victory could have been reversed by Nixon's winning New
York). 142 The college seemed to magnify a very close election again in 1968
when Nixon took a razor-thin plurality of the popular vote over Hubert
Humphrey (43.4% to 42.7%, with George Wallace taking 13.5%), yet won
handily in the electoral college, 301 to 191.143 Because these two elections

took place during the era of the modem media, it appeared that the electoral
college always, as if by magic, took a tight election in the popular vote and
expanded it into 144
a wider and more legitimate mandate for the winner in the
electoral college.

The 2000 election burst this bubble. In a popular vote that was not as
close as 1960 or 1968, Al Gore collected more votes than George W. Bush,
45
yet lost the electoral college by the toothpick-thin margin of 271 to 267.1
The virtual tie in Florida, which spawned aborted recounts and litigation,
46
determined the winner of the electoral college and thus the presidency.

because Democratic voters in a few deep southern states, angry at Johnson's civil rights legislation,
abandoned him en masse for Republican Barry Goldwater. See id.
138. See id at 100.
139. Seeid at 136.
140. See id. at 146.
141. See BEST, supra note 1, at 204; HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 5, 24-26, 29; Storing, supra
note 114, at 400-02. Hardaway, Best, and Storing wrote before the election of 2000, of course.
142. See MIECZKOWSKI, supranote 7, at 117.
143. See id. at 124.
144. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 1, at 204; STORING, supra note 114, at 400-02. Both wrote as
if the electoral college mechanically magnified the popular vote.
145. See STORING, supra note 114, at 149. Gore took 48.4% of the popular vote to Bush's
47.9%. Id.
146. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The final count gave Gore a 537-vote victory in
Florida. See WORLD ALMANAC 576 (2004).
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Indeed, the election would have turned if any state that Bush won had gone to
Gore-even 3-vote Wyoming or 4-vote New Hampshire-not just 25-vote
Florida.1 47 This is not the place to re-argue the contentious legal issues of the
Florida vote, nor the possibility that if the 2000 election had been decided
through a popular vote Bush might have demanded a nationwide recount (as
Nixon or Humphrey might have). Nonetheless, the 2000 election plainly
served to dispel the notion that the electoral college always magnifies a close
popular vote to create a more legitimate-appearing outcome.
Indeed, a wider view of United States presidential history reveals that the
elections of 1960 and 1968 were not typical. Over the past 200 years, the
electoral college has not consistently and significantly widened the margin of
victory when the popular vote is very close. Of the eleven elections in which
the popular vote was within four percentage points, three times the electoral
college formula awarded the presidency to the candidate who gathered fewer
popular votes. These diverging outcome elections were in (1) 1876, when
Democrat Samuel Tilden won more popular votes, yet lost to Rutherford B.
Hayes after a disputed electoral college tally, 185-184,148 (2) 1888, when
incumbent Democratic President Grover Cleveland lost to Benjamin
Harrison, 149 and (3) 2000, when Bush defeated Gore. 150 Six other times the
electoral vote, although wider than the popular tally, was still close enough
that a switch of just one state would have swung the election-1844,1 51
1880,152 1884,' 1916,154 1960,155 and 1976.156 In only two of the eleven close
elections was the electoral margin greater than the electoral clout of any one
state--1892 157 and 1968.158 Only two substantial magnifications out of eleven

147.
148.
149.
150.

See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 149.
See id.at 63-64.
See id. at 71-72.
A fourth divergent outcome occurred in 1824, when John Quincy Adams was elected by

the House of Representatives after capturing only 30.5% of the popular vote. See id at 29-30.
Andrew Jackson won 43. 1%of the popular tally but failed to win a majority of the electoral college
(in fact, he only won 37.9% of the electoral vote, though still more than Adams' 32.2%), sending the
election to the House. See id.
151. James K. Polk beat Henry Clay, 170-105, including New York's 36 votes. See id at 44.
152. James A. Garfield won 214-155, including New York's 35 votes, over Winfield Scott
Hancock. See id.at 66.
153. Grover Cleveland beat James G. Blaine, 219-182, including New York's 36 votes. See id.
at 70.
154. Woodrow Wilson edged Charles Evan Hughes, 277-254, including California's 13 votes.
See id. at 88.

155. John F. Kennedy prevailed over Richard M. Nixon, 303-219, including New York's 45
votes. See id at 117.
156. Jimmy Carter beat Gerald Ford, 297-240, including New York's 41 votes. See id at 130.
157. Grover Cleveland gained revenge against Benjamin Harrison, 277-145. See id. at 74.
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close elections cannot support a theory of greater legitimacy for the electoral
college.
Even if the electoral college did consistently make elections more "clearcut," this would not necessarily make them more legitimate.159 While some
supporters of a candidate who won 70% of the electoral vote have trumpeted a
"mandate" from the people, such a majority concealed the fact that fewer than
half of the American voters actually chose the winner-as happened with Bill
Clinton's reelection in 1996.160 Indeed, the diverging outcomes of the 2000
election, concluded by the Supreme Court,161 prompted some mild civic
protest among Gore supporters, in part through the popular "He's Not the
President" bumper stickers. 162 In sum, the possibility of a diverging outcome
makes the electoral college arguably less "legitimate" than a simpler and more
straightforward system of direct popular election.
C. A FederalistBoostfor Small States?
Does the electoral college system aid any particular groups among the
popular electorate? For decades, political scientists and statisticians have
attempted to determine a "bias" in the electoral system. In a pithy passage,
Professor Hardaway summed up the variety of these efforts: "[I]t has
variously been claimed that the Electoral College creates a bias against
rapidly growing states, states with high voter turnout, Northern African
Americans, Southern African Americans, Mexican Americans, Mormons, and
homosexuals. It has been claimed that the Electoral College favors Italians,
suburbanites, Jews, and 'Narrowly Defined economic interests."' 163
For the most part, these assertions have been predicated on the truism that
because states vote by blocks under the unit rule, the outcome of the election

Populist candidate James B. Weaver won four western states and 22 electoral votes. See id. Of the
five consecutive very close popular votes from 1876 through 1892, the last was the only one in which
the victor won the electoral college handily. See id.
158. Richard M. Nixon beat Hubert H. Humphrey 301-191. See id. at 124.
159. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 5, 26 (arguing that the electoral college usually creates a
"clear-cut" winner).
160. See Greenberg Research, The PopularMandateof 1996, at http://www.greenbergresearch.
com/publications/reports/r thepopularmandate_1996_111296.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
Clinton won only 49.2% of the popular vote, but 70.4% of the electoral vote. See MIECZKOWSKI,
supra note 7, at 146.
161. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ordering a halt to the recount in Florida, thus

resolving the election for Bush).
162. See Allan Fotheringham, What Didn't Happen in the Ballot Booth, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec.
19, 2000, at A 15 (discussing the popularity of the bumper stickers soon after the election was
decided by the Supreme Court).
163. HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 22 and accompanying notes.
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may turn on a few specific states. Accordingly, the voters of some large
states, which might include a disproportionate number of gays or blacks, may
sometimes appear to hold an outsized effect on the election.' 64 I do not
address all the assertions of electoral college bias, except to scrutinize the
claims that certain specific states are benefited by the electoral college. I do
not scrutinize whether the college gives an "unfair" advantage to any groups
in any normative sense, but simply whether the electoral college gives a
as comparedto the clout that it would hold
benefit to any state's voting power
65
under a direct popular election.1
Many commentators have reasoned that because the biggest blocks of
electors are awarded from the largest states, the electoral college thus gives an
advantage to the voters of these states. 166 In a widely cited article written in
the late 1960s, Professor John Banzhaf used historical data to claim with
of
amusing mathematical precision that the electoral college gave citizens 167
large states 3.312 times more influence than citizens of small states.
the
Professor Judith Best, a political scientist, also claimed in the 1970s that
68
power.'
of
terms
in
boost
a
states
urban
competitive
large
college gives
The assumptions of a large-state advantage in the electoral college do not
withstand scrutiny, however. Of course it is true that it is far better for a
candidate to capture California's 55 electoral votes than Wyoming's 3 votes.
However, a similar assertion could be made with a direct vote. It is far better
to carry a certain majority among California's eleven million individual voters
than among the 0.2 million voters in Wyoming. 69 With a direct vote, a
candidate is encouraged to try to collect any individual vote that he or she can
across the nation; under the electoral college, the candidate is encouraged to
gather any electoral vote available. It is true that the largest states-New
York from 1812 through 1968, and California from 1972-have good
170
historical records of agreeing with the nationwide electoral college tally.

164. See id. (summarizing the arguments).
165. My study leads me to conclude that assumptions of bias for certain states or certain
demographic groups are meaningless, in that they cannot predict the future. While some groups may
seem to have a greater clout in some elections, changing circumstances may give them less in other
elections. I agree with Professor Hardaway's apparent conclusion on this point.
166. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 1, at 208; Banzhaf, supra note 3.
167. See Banzhaf, supra note 3.
168. See BEST, supra note 1, at 208-09.
169. See Federal Election Comm'n, Voter Registration and Turnout 2000, available at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
170. As the largest state from 1812 through 1968, New York agreed with the electoral college
winner 32 times, and disagreed only 8 times (the 1824 election produced no electoral college
winner). New York's prominence seemed most apparent during the longest stretch of close elections
in the nation's history, from 1876 through 1892, when the nation was divided nearly evenly among
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However, these states' votes also correlate with the nationwide popular
vote.' 71 Other states have good records of agreeing with the national vote; it
was a small state, not New York,72 that was referred to in the old saying, "As
1
Maine goes, so goes the nation."'
Recent history, moreover, has not been kind to the assumption that the
electoral college aids voters in large states. After 1964, the largest state has
voted with the winner only six times out of nine elections, a smaller
correlation than that of Kentucky or Arkansas, both of which have voted with
the winner eight times out of nine. 173 Indeed, in the three very close elections
of the past 40 years-1968, 1976, and 2000-the largest state voted with the
loser all three times. 74
The election of 2000 revealed the fecklessness of an argument that large
states sway the electoral college. Al Gore carried both California and New
York, the biggest electoral prizes, but lost the nationwide electoral tally. 175 Of
the six largest states, Gore won four; of the ten largest, Gore took six. 17 6 In
fact, recent history has led to an interesting intellectual turn away from
Banzhaf's and Best's assertion that large states hold a disproportionate sway
on the electoral college. Some of today's federalists, carrying the banner of
state authority, claim that the college gives an advantage to small states.177
Professor Hardaway has argued that a boost to small states' voting power
created by the electoral college system is an integral part of the "Grand
compromise" of 1787.178 The electoral college gives "protection" to the
Democratic and Republican voters. The South was solidly Democratic, while the North mostly voted
Republican. With its large immigrant population, New York sometimes bucked the northern trend.
When Democrat Grover Cleveland carried New York in 1884 and 1892, a Democrat was elected to
the White House for the only time between the Civil War and Woodrow Wilson. When Cleveland
lost New York in the middle of his three campaigns, he lost the presidency. See MIECZKOWSKI,
supra note 7, at 25-124. Since California became the largest state in 1972, it has agreed with the
electoral college six times and disagreed twice, in 1976 and 2000. See id. at 127-49.
171. In fact, the voters of the largest states agreed with the nationwide popular vote and
disagreed with the electoral college winner in two of the four divergent outcome elections-those of
1876 and 2000. See id.at 64, 149.
172. See Joseph C. Sweeney, Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some
Problems Particularto Collision, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 241, 241 n. 1 (2001) (discussing the history
of the slogan). Traditionally Republican Maine voted with the nation most often until the ascent of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. See MIECZKOWSKI, supranote 7, at 97.
173. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 127-49.
174. See id
175. Seeid.at 149.
176. See id.
177. See, e.g., HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 14; Victoria Sutton, The Electoral College-Now,
More Than Ever, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2001); Hunt, supra note 113.
178. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 14 (asserting that the compromises made in crafting the
electoral college reflect "the vision and genius of the constitutional framers"), 81-82, 163.
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small states and thus must be preserved if the great federalist contract is to be
preserved, he argued. 179 The famous compromise of the constitutional
convention in the summer of 1787 attempted to give small states power in
Congress far beyond their proportional population, by giving each state equal
representation in the U.S. Senate, while allotting votes by population in the
House of Representatives. Hardaway also asserted that the 1787 drafters
expected small states to have even more relative power than they typically
wield in the electoral college vote. Citing George Mason's prediction of
"nineteen times of twenty," Hardaway concluded that many conventioneers
expected that the President would often be elected by the House of
Representatives in state-by-state voting, which of course would give the small
states a clout equal to that of the large states.1 80 As with the old large-statebias argument, however, I contend that the argument of a significant
advantage to the small states under the current electoral college system is
overstated.
There are a number of flaws with an assertion that the electoral college
system is an equal facet, with congressional representation, of the federalist
compromise in favor of small states of the summer of 1787. First, the boost to
the relative voting power granted to small states in the electoral college is far,
far smaller today than the boost given to small states by their Senate
congressional representation. Assuming that the U.S. Senate holds power
equal to the House of Representatives (and many would say that in practice it
exercises more), Wyoming holds about 1.28% of the total congressional
voting power (the average of Wyoming's 1/50 share of the Senate vote and
1/435 share of the House vote), as compared to California's 5.95%
(considering California's fifty-three votes in the House). Thus Wyoming
holds more than a fifth of the voting power of California in Congress. By
contrast, in the electoral college, Wyoming holds less than one-eighteenth of
the voting power of California (three electoral votes for Wyoming, fifty-five
for California).18 1 The electoral college, therefore, is a very poor relation
indeed to Congress in giving extra power to small states.
Second, to the extent that conventioneers of 1787 expected that most
presidential elections would be decided by the House, they thus expected that
the electoral college vote would play a less significant role in the presidential
179. See id. at 78-79.
180. See id at 81-82.
181. Of the 16 small states with fewer than two million citizens (including the District of
Columbia, which has 3 electoral votes), their combined 59 electoral votes give them 10.9% of the
total, as compared with their 6.0% share of the national population. The numbers from the 2000
census, which were used to allocate members of Congress and the current electoral college votes, are
available at WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 374 (population data), 606 (electoral data).
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electoral process-merely identifying potential Presidents-than would the
House vote, which would actually elect the chief executive. Considering,
however, the amount of time that the convention spent in crafting the details
of the electoral college, as compared with the time they spent on the details of
the House vote, my supposition is that many members frankly did not know
whether the electoral college would frequently fail to elect a President. To the
extent that drafters were uncertain as to the workings of the electoral system
in future practice, it is far more difficult to argue that the drafters created a
highly delicate and balanced system of federalism with which we should not
tinker.
A third and final criticism is that George Mason turned out to be just plain
wrong-the House has not chosen the President in most elections (it has not
done so since 1824). The primary reason for the success of the electoral
college in electing a majority winner was the rise of political parties, which
nominate national candidates whose popularity transcends the state borders
that Mason thought would limit a particular candidate's electoral support.
Thus, to the extent that the 1787 system is defended as an aspect of federalism
because it gave the small states-through the voting procedures in the House
vote-voting power equal to that of the large states, this aspect of federalism
was almost instantly and definitively frustrated by the rise of political parties.
Moreover, it is a matter of characterization to conclude that the college's
small boost for small states gives individual voters in these states more
influence than they would enjoy under a direct popular vote. On a case-bycase basis, of course, voters in small states often have reason to disagree that
the electoral college helps them. In 2000, for example, a majority of voters in
Vermont, the nation's second-least-populous state, voted for Gore. 182 The
Gore voters in Vermont presumably were not assuaged by the fact that
Vermont cast its three electoral votes for Gore, which failed to get him
elected. Under a direct popular vote, the majority in Vermont would have
been part of a nationwide Gore plurality victory. 183 In most elections, the
small state boost has not affected the outcome; as defenders point out, the
college often provides comfortable victory margins. Only five times since the
margin
rise of the modem two-party system in 1856 has the electoral college
184
states.
smallest
sixteen
the
of
votes
combined
the
than
been thinner
As James Madison pointed out in 1787,185 a boost for small states does not
182. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 149.
183. See id.
184. The elections were 1876 (one vote margin), 1884 (37 votes), 1912 (23 votes), 1976 (57
votes), and 2000 (4 votes). See id. at 50-149.
185. See MEE, JR., supra note 17, at 195 (discussing Madison's statements during the debate
over congressional apportionment in the constitutional convention of 1787).
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necessarily favor any particular position or candidate. Small states vary in
their location, urbanization, and political propensities.
After the 2000
election, it was asserted that the electoral college benefits today's
Republicans, in that most small states are rural, and rural states tend to vote
Republican.' 86 The recent tendency of Democrats to appeal to voters on the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts, while Republicans dominate the more central
states, has led to much commentary over a supposedly wide divide between a
"blue America" of coastal, urban, skeptical Democratic voters, and a "red
87
America" of central, small-town, family-oriented Republican citizens.'
To the extent that the red/blue division exists in today's United States, it
does not necessarily translate into a small-state benefit for Republicans. The
historical fact that most small states were in the less densely populated West
is a disappearing phenomenon. As the nation's citizens continue to move
west, the group of the least populous states becomes more evenly divided
between the central and Rocky Mountain states, which in recent years have
voted overwhelmingly Republican, and the Northeast. Of the sixteen least
populous states, six are in the northeastern comer of the nation. 188 Gore
carried six of the sixteen smallest states in 2000, not89a significantly lower
share than his nationwide tally of twenty of fifty states. 1
Perhaps a stronger argument for federalism is that the small state boost in
the electoral college encourages presidential candidates to collect states, as
opposed to simply gathering individual votes. With every state victory, the
unit voting system in effect gives the candidate a bonus of two electoral votes,
representing the state's two senators, beyond what the candidate would have
received in a college allocated by the numbers of members in the House of
Representatives, which in turn approximates population. These collectingstates' bonuses are not trivial; they may occasionally change the outcome.
Without the two-vote bonus for each state, George W. Bush, who collected
thirty states, would have captured only 211 electoral votes instead of 271,
while Al Gore, who won twenty-one jurisdictions (including the District of

186. See Hunt, supranote 113.
187. See, e.g., David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec.
2001) (supposedly coining the "red America"/"blue America" terminology, from the colors typically
used on election night television), at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/12/brooks.htm (last
visited July 23, 2004); Robert David Sullivan, Beyond Red and Blue, It Will Take a CandidateMore
Than Two Colors to Get to the White House, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2004, at HI.
188. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 374. Small does not necessarily mean rural.
Rhode Island, for example, is 43rd in population, but is second in terms of the percentage of
population in large metropolitan areas. See Demographia, Share of Population in UrbanizedAreas
Over 1,000,000: USA States & DC: 2000, at http://www.demographia.com/db-statescuza.pdf (last
visited July 23, 2004).
189. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 149.
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Columbia), would have gathered 224 votes instead of 266.190 Under a fair
characterization, the collecting-states bonuses decided the extraordinarily
close election for Bush.' 9'
This is not to say, however, that the candidate who collects the most states
always wins. In 1976, Jimmy Carter won only twenty-three states to Gerald
R. Ford's twenty-seven states, yet won the electoral college. 92 Before that,
Richard Nixon gathered twenty-six states to John Kennedy's twenty-two in
1960 (Harry Byrd won most of the votes of Mississippi and Alabama), but
Kennedy won the election. 93 In 1896, Democrat William Jennings Bryan
collected twenty-three states to Republican William McKinley's twenty-two,
yet lost the college.1 94 While the collecting-states bonus helps a candidate, it
does not ensure victory.
The collecting-states bonus might be considered a form of federalism, in
that it encourages candidates to view states as distinct states, not simply
masses of individual voters. It cannot be denied that the electoral college
encourages parties to plan and organize by states, in part in order to win one
state or another. 195 To the extent that campaigns are run by "paying attention"
to a particular region or group, the college encourages candidates to focus on
states as states. If this is a form of federalism, however, it is only a meager
one. It encourages consideration of states as geographic locations with
borders, but does not give states themselves any right to exercise independent
sovereignty.
In any event, the supposed federalist benefit of paying attention to states
as states is counterbalanced by another effect of the electoral college. This
phenomenon causes candidates to ignore some states. Because of unit voting,
it is not any better to collect a large margin of victory, as opposed to a small
one, in any given state. Likewise, losing a state by a small margin, as
opposed to a large one, does not do a candidate any good. One either carries

190. See id.

191. Similarly, in 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes collected 21 states to Samuel J. Tilden's 17 and
won the electoral vote by one tally, 184-185. In another of the series of parallels between the
disputed 1876 vote and the disputed 2000 election, the winner of fewer electoral votes and states,
Tilden, gathered more popular votes. See id. at 64. In the strange election of 1916, Democrat
Woodrow Wilson secured a popular vote margin of moderate size over Republican Charles Evans
Hughes-49.3% to 46. 10/-and collected 30 states to Hughes' 18. Oddly, however, Wilson won the
electoral vote only by the narrow margin of 277-254. Victory in one additional large state would
have given Hughes an electoral victory. See id. at 88-89.
192. See id. at 130.
193. See id. at 117. Kennedy's popular vote margin was minuscule-49.7% to 49.6%. See id.
194. See id. at 78. The popular vote was not particularly close; William McKinley won, 51.0%
to 46.7% See id.
195. See, e.g., STORING, supra note 114, at 400.
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the state or does not. Accordingly, candidates are encouraged to focus their
attention on "swing states"-states in which the outcome may still be
swayed. 196 Considering limited time and resources, they are also discouraged
from paying attention to states in which the outcome appears fairly clear,
either for or against them. Thus, citizens in states with a strong leaning to one
candidate or the other may find that the nominees give them little attention
during the campaign. The swing-statefocus means that entire states may get
short shrifts during the campaign. Consider the 2000 election; early on, it was
fairly clear that George W. Bush would almost certainly carry his home state
of Texas, the third most populous state, while Al Gore held sizeable leads in
both California and New York, the two largest states. 197 While Bush of
course would have liked to have swayed New York, it certainly made more
sense to focus energy on states he felt he might swing his way, or in which
effort was needed to hold off his opponent. 98 Thus, neither Bush nor Gore
spent much time campaigning in Texas or New York, where the outcomes
seemed foregone conclusions.19 9
The swing-state focus engendered by the electoral college sharpens as the
election looms closer and more states are assigned to one camp or the other.
Accordingly, Bush spent a large amount of time in the final weeks before the
2000 election stumping in West Virginia, which pollsters identified as still a
swing state in the final stages of the season. 200 Like many states that used to
be labor-oriented, and thus Democratic, West Virginia in recent years has
become more suburban and thus more Republican. 20 Bush's West Virginia
strategy appeared to pay off; the Texas governor carried the historically

196. By mid-2004, both of the two apparent established party candidates--George W. Bush
and John Kerry-were focusing nearly all their campaigning on the handful of "swing states." See,
e.g., Jackie Calmes, Laura Bush Does Solo Stint-First Lady Takes to the Road as President's
CharacterWitness, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 25, 2004, at A3; Robert J. McCarthy, Unions on Election
Footing; Kerry's Supporters Pour into Swing States Like Pennsylvania, BUFFALO NEWS, June 27,
2004, at Al; Alessandra Stanley, From Daisy to Willie, PoliticalAds in U.S., INT'L HERALD TRIB.,

July 1,2004, at 2.
197. Dotty Lynch, Don't Look Back (Apr. 12, 2001) (arguing that the electoral college
encouraged Bush and Gore "to virtually ignore the voters in four of the six most populous statesCalifornia, Texas, New York and Illinois"), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/12/politics/
main285366.shtml (last visited July 23, 2004).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Races Kick Off Early, Both Parties See West Virginia as Key in Election,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 13, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Races Kick Off Early] (discussing Bush's

campaign focus on West Virginia in 2000).
201. See Jack Beatty, Plunder on the Right, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (May 2, 2001) (discussing

the politics of West Virginia and other traditionally labor-oriented states),
http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/polipro/pp200l-05-02.htm (last visited July 23, 2004).
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Democratic state, and West Virginia's five electoral votes made the difference
in the final 271-266 electoral tally. 20 2 In sum, the electoral college does
indeed encourage candidates to view states as states, but this incentive may
result in neglect as often as attention-hardly a form of productive federalism.
What effect would a direct popular vote have on campaign strategy? With
state boundaries irrelevant, candidates would be encouraged to focus on issues
or regions in which they could sway the largest number of voters. Candidates
might tend to make more appearances in major metropolitan areas, in order to
reach the most voters. Federalists might accuse this incentive of creating a
"bias" in favor of urban areas. This may be true, but it seems churlish to
criticize a system that simply encourages politicians to try to reach the most
voters with their messages. Political campaigns might resemble a nationwide
marketing plan; marketers view the nation as a whole, and craft their message
accordingly. 3 From the experience of marketing entertainment or household
products, we might expect candidates to focus on the middle of the marketthe great suburban masses that make up an increasing majority of the nation,
not the much smaller population segments, such as farmers, metrosexuals, or
the central-city poor. 204 But this strategy would hardly look much different
from that encouraged by our current political process. 205
Judith Best has suggested that a switch from the college to popular voting
would cause a change from "geographic" political campaigning, targeting a
few swing states, to national "issue-oriented" campaigning.20 6 Some may see
this as a loss of federalism, but voters in all states except the chosen swing
states might welcome the change.

202. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 149; Races Kick Off Early, supranote 200.
203. See, e.g., Ass'n of National Advertisers, Media Plan Development (discussing methods of
marketing across the nation), at http://www.ana.net/events/semdesc.cfm?SeminarlD=54 (last visited
July 23, 2004).
204. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Family Households (March 1999) (showing that a majority
of American families live in suburbs), at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/p20537/1999/tabFl.pdf (last visited July 23, 2004); see generally William Schneider, The Suburban
Century Begins, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (July 1992) (discussing the dominant role of the suburbs as
the majority group in the Untied States), at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ecbig/schnsub.htm;
see also Stanley L. Iezman, Suburban to the Core (Oct. 1989) (discussing the trend in quality real
estate investment moving away from cities and towards suburbs), at http://www.americanreal.com/
publications/articlel .shtml (last visited July 23, 2004).
205. See Schneider, supra note 204 (arguing that politics is focused more and more on
suburban voters); PBS, Courting the Middle Class (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 18, 2000), at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec0O/middle_class.html (discussing how both Bush
and Gore in 2000 courted middle-class voters, nearly exclusively) (last visited July 23, 2004).
206. See BEST, supra note 1, at 214.
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D. Avoiding a Regional President?

Perhaps the weightiest federalist claim for the electoral college is that it
guards against the election of a "regional" President, which supposedly is a
hazard of a direct popular vote. By deflating large popular vote margins in
big states, Professor Best has argued, the college helps ensure that a winning
20 7
candidate has support from across the nation, not just in one region.
Analyzing this federalist contention with some simple mathematics and logic,
I conclude that a direct election would not risk a regional President any more
than does the electoral system. Indeed, it is the electoral college that poses the
greater risk of a regional, minority President. Under one definition, the
college may already have elected such a President-Abraham Lincoln in
1860.
The concern is straightforward. By limiting the potential clout of a large
state, the college makes a landslide victory in that state irrelevant; California
will give the winner of its election fifty-five electoral votes in 2004,
regardless of whether the margin of victory is 500 votes or five million.
Under a direct popular vote, however, a bigger and bigger margin does more
and more to help the winner. By doing extremely well in one or a few big
states, a candidate may make up for doing relatively poorly in a much larger
number of states. The federalist concern appears to be that huge margins in
one or a few large states, or in one region, may sway an election to one
candidate, regardless of a lack of support in other regions.
This argument does not survive scrutiny, however. In order to capture a
majority of votes across the nation, it is a truism that a candidate cannot
gather votes solely from a small number of states. One simply cannot collect
more than half of the popular vote in a region that encompasses fewer than
half of the voters. 20 8 Even by capturing 70% of the vote in California (by far
the largest state, with about 13% of the nation's population), New York, and
Texas, or in a discrete region such as the northeast states, the Great Lakes
states, or the West Coast, the candidate would still be far short of a majority
of the popular vote. 20 9 If, say, the West Coast states ever do grow to comprise
a majority of the nation's voters, it would be possible for a candidate to win
the election by appealing to this region alone. Under this scenario, however,
207. See id at 82, 206.
208. Of course, it is conceivably possible that a candidate could capture 51% of the popular
votes by winning every single vote in a region of states that comprises 51% of the voters. Under
such an extreme scenario, however, the candidate is likely to also win the electoral college, by
winning a slight majority of the electoral vote. As explained below, the electoral college makes it
more likely that a candidate could be elected President without any significant support from a region
of the nation.
209. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 566-604 for state population figures.
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the candidate probably would also win the electoral2college
(by winning states
10
that encompassed a majority of the electoral votes).

A fear appears to be that, with a popular vote, a handful of large urban
states could somehow mobilize millions upon millions of voters from the
alleys of the big cities, and that these masses (What ethnicity do we imagine
them to be? Which party would they be likely to support?) could somehow
vote in numbers that would overwhelm the rest of the nation. Such a
phenomenon is not real, however; even if there were such huge numbers of
voters in the urban states, their numbers would give their states a majority of
the electoral votes as well.21'
A candidate whose support is confined largely to one region would find it
nearly impossible to win a direct popular vote among two candidates. Even if
the candidate managed to draw an impressive 70% of the vote across a region
that constitutes one-third of the population, this would give him or her only
23% of the vote-far short of a majority. Expanding the region to half the
nation would still yield only 35% of the vote. Even if we pushed the
definition of region to include 60% of the country, the candidate would still
gather only 42%. (By contrast, as I explore below, a candidate who won a
region of states that encompassed 60% of the nation would automatically win
the electoral college, regardless of whether he or she took a single popular
vote from the rest of the country.)
With three or more viable candidates, the picture becomes murkier. With
three in the race, it is possible to capture a plurality with only 34%approximately what Jesse Ventura did as a successful third-party candidate in
the Minnesota gubernatorial election of 1998.212 A candidate could capture all
or nearly all of the necessary 34% from only one region. Uneasiness with
such a "minority" President is heightened by the fact that this might facilitate
election of an extremist President-say, a panderer to ethnic hatred-even
though the extremist might be the last choice of a majority of the electorate

210. Indeed, if one state included a majority of the population, the winner of this state would
automatically win the electoral college, regardless of the vote elsewhere-a drawback that would not
necessarily occur under a popular vote.
211. Somewhat whimsically, perhaps the concern is that there are uncounted millions of
Americans living in the big cities who have not been counted in the Census, and thus did not count in
the allocation of electoral votes, but who could nonetheless be mobilized by a particular party in a
presidential election. Such a fear might be an expansion of the concern of some Republicans that
easier voter registration-such as through the "motor voter" laws-would give an unfair advantage
to the Democratic Party. See, e.g., George F. Will, Is This Any Way to Vote?, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,
2000, at B7 (criticizing the "motor voter" laws).
212. Thus, Minnesota elected third-party candidate Jesse Ventura to its governorship in 1998
with only 37% of the vote. See CNN, Election Results, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/1998/
states/MN/G/ (last visited July 23, 2004).
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(which split its vote among the other two choices). This concern justifies a
runoff vote, in which the winner would have to be relatively acceptable to a
majority of the electorate in the second vote. Runoffs have been routine in
France's current Fifth Republic, for example, in which Gaullists, Socialists,
Communists, and extreme nationalists have all vied for power.2 13 But the
need for a runoff to avoid a minority President is not limited to a popular vote
system. The current electoral college system includes, in effect, a runoff in
the House of Representatives when the college does not agree on a majority
winner. With a strong third-party candidate who captures states, especially in
one region, it is quite possible that the presidential vote under the electoral
system would be decided by a House runoff-as predicted by some of the
framers of 1787, and as occurred in the election of 1824, when there were four
viable candidates.214
A real concern of federalists under the two-party system might be what I
call the dominant region scenario: With a direct popular vote, it is
conceivable that a candidate could draw so well in one state or a small region
that he or she could lose every other state yet still win the election-a
phenomenon that could never happen with the electoral college, in which state
margins of victory are irrelevant. Let us assume that a candidate captured an
impressive 70% of the vote in California, but took only a losing 49% in the
remaining forty-nine states. Because California holds about one-ninth of the
nation's voters, the California margin would probably give the candidate a
nationwide popular vote victory (with about 52% of the vote).21 5 Because the
candidate won the most votes in only one of fifty states, would this be the
feared "regional" President? It would not be. Our candidate's support was
not confined largely to California (and we could replace California with the
Northeast, the Midwest, Southeast, or any other region); indeed, the candidate
has drawn close to 50% of the vote across the nation. Accordingly, under any
reasonable definition, our President would not be merely a regional President.
If we removed the significant level of voting support from the other regions,
the candidate would have a far more difficult time in collecting the necessary
50% of the nationwide popular vote.
Federalists might be distressed by the fact that a direct popular vote makes
it possible to elect a President who won the most votes in only one state or
213. See Wikipedia, Runoff Voting, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runoffvoting (last visited
July 23, 2004). It is telling that only the centrist candidates, the Socialists and the "Rally for the
Republic" Gaullists, have emerged victorious in the runoffs. See Wikipedia, Presidentof France, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President-of France (last visited July 23, 2004).
214. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 30.
215. Under the electoral college system, the California-winning candidate would lose, 483-55.
See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 606 (indicating electoral college allocations).
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region. But the point of a popular vote tally does not depend, of course, on
"winning" states. I suggest a source of the federalist concern is an excessive
fixation on the election-night television practice of shading a map with red or
blue colors, depending on who has captured the simple majority (or even
plurality) of the states' electoral votes. This colored map syndrome fails to
acknowledge, among other faults, that state voting results are not simply "red"
or "blue"-they may be overwhelming victories, such as a candidate who
captures 70% of the vote, or tight margins, epitomized by George W. Bush's
537-vote margin among more than five million voters (less than 0.01%) in
Florida in 2000. The colored map syndrome oversimplifies--or "dumbs
down," in today's cultural rhetoric-the complexities of the popular vote. If
we release our fixation on coloring the map and focus instead on the popular
vote results in states, regions, and the nation-something we are accustomed
to doing for other elections, of course-we may understand the presidential
election in a subtly different, and more complex, manner.
Contrary to federalists such as Best, I contend that it is the electoral
college that poses the greater risk of electing a "regional" President. In
particular, the electoral system risks choosing a President who both (1) lacks
significant support throughout the nation and (2) is the top choice of a distinct
minority of Americans-a President that I will characterize with the
intentionally disturbing moniker of a regional,minority President. Under the
college's unit voting system, a candidate who fails to gain even minimal
support throughout a region is in no worse electoral shape than a candidate
who has just fallen short in the popular vote among the voters of each of this
region's states. The candidate gets zero votes. Likewise, a candidate who
wins a state by a small margin captures all the state's electoral votes, and can
do no better by increasing his or her margin of victory. These phenomena
might encourage a candidate who has weak support in a region to ignore this
region entirely and focus his or her campaign elsewhere, in hope of electoral
victories in the rest of the nation. The electoral college thus enables a
candidate who wins states that encompass a bare majority of the electoral
votes to capture the presidency, even if the candidate has failed to show any
significant support elsewhere.
To complete the disturbing scenario, the candidate might be elected with
far less than a majority of the nationwide popular vote, by virtue of the fact
that he or she needs only to win by small margins in the states that encompass
a bare majority of the electoral votes. To give numbers to the example, the
candidate could capture 55% of the vote in each of a group of states that, in
total, encompasses 55% of the electoral vote. These numbers would give the
candidate the presidency in the college, even though these states give the
candidate only 31% (.55 times .55) of the nationwide vote. In a two-person
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race, the candidate would defeat his or her rival even without any popular
votes in the remaining states, constituting the other 45% of the nation (a fairly
large region, indeed), and even if the opponent garnered 69% of the nation's
popular votes. This would be a regional, minority President.
Lest one think this scenario is contrived, I maintain that a regional,
minority President was once elected-Abraham Lincoln in 1860. In this
pivotal contest, Lincoln, running for the six-year-old Republican Party,
gathered significant support throughout the northern states.21 6 Democrat
Stephen Douglas, who had defeated Lincoln in the Illinois Senate race two
years before and who was the standard-bearer of the party that had elected the
majority of the nation's Presidents to date, also drew some support across the
North, largely among moderates who favored popular sovereignty to decide
whether slavery would expand to territories.21 7 In the southern states,
however, hostility to Douglas's perceived moderation and to all things
2
northern led to a split in the Democratic Party. 218
Southern Democrats
separately nominated John C. Breckinridge, committed to confronting the
northern states, while a fourth candidate, Constitutional Union Party leader
John Bell, drew support among southerners who favored conciliation.2 19
Despite absolutely no support in the South, Lincoln outpolled Douglas, often
decisively but sometimes by only thin margins, in every northern state but
two. 2 20
Because the northern states encompassed more than half of the
electoral vote, support in these states alone allowed Lincoln to capture the
electoral college with 59.4% of the electoral vote. He was elected President
even though Lincoln was the choice of only 39.9% of the nation's voters.22'
Lincoln received the smallest popular vote percentage of any President chosen
by the electoral college.222 By virtue of his failure to capture any support in
the South, and by virtue of the fact that he failed to get the vote of even two
out of five Americans, Lincoln is properly characterized as a regional,
minority presidential victor in 1860.
Because of Lincoln's towering humanity, stirring rhetoric, and leadership
of the nation through its greatest crisis, he is often considered our greatest

216. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 54.
217. See id. at 52-54. Douglas won 29.4%, nearly all in the North. Id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See HistoryCentral.com, PresidentialElections, 1860, at http://www.multied.com/
elections/l860.html# (last visited July 23, 2004). Lincoln won California, for example, with only
32.3% of the vote. Id.
221. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 54.
222. See id. at 12-149.
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President. 23 This should not blind us to the fact, however, that the potentially
disastrous scenario warned of by some federalists-that a regional President
would lack national legitimacy-plainly did transpire in the wake of Lincoln's
election. Infuriated by what they viewed as the election of an extremist
President (it appears possible that the more moderate Douglas would have
defeated Lincoln if the two had faced each other in a nationwide popular vote
runoff because of Lincoln's complete lack of support among southern
voters 224), southern states soon thereafter declared secession from the union,

prompting the Civil War that would claim more than half a million lives. 225 If
we are searching to imagine a crisis of legitimacy, this was it.
Indeed, a "regional presidency" might describe the elections of all the
Republican Presidents for generations, until the GOP finally made inroads
among southern voters in the 1960s. 226 Republicans dominated presidential
politics from 1860 through 1928 (only Grover Cleveland and Woodrow
Wilson were elected from the Democratic Party, each twice, during this
period 227). The northern region dominated the southern simply by having an
electoral vote majority.228 The fact that Republicans were unable to draw any
significant support among southern voters did not hurt them in the college, in
which overwhelming defeats are no worse than close ones, and small victories
are as good as huge ones.229
223. See, e.g., Michael Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865), at http://www.american
president.org/history/abrahamlincoln ("Almost all historians judge Lincoln as the greatest President
in American history.") (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
224. The two Democratic candidates, Stephen Douglas and John C. Breckenridge, together
took more than 47% of the vote. Add to this total a good share of Bell's 12.6%, gathered mostly in
the Democratic-dominated South, and Douglas probably would have won a runoff popular vote. See
MIECZKOWSKI, supranote 7, at 54.
225. See MORISON ET AL., supra note 85, at 267-70 (explaining that Lincoln's election was an
impetus to secession); id at 319 (the Civil War resulted in more than 600,000 military deaths alone).
226. Very few Republican candidates won any states in the Democrats' "Solid South" from the
end of Reconstruction in 1876 until the Civil Rights era of the 1960s. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note
7, at 64-120.
227. See id. Cleveland was elected in 1884 and 1892; Wilson won in 1912 and 1916. See id. at
68-89.
228. See id.
229. 1 do not mean to suggest that under a direct popular vote the Democrats would have won
most of the elections. Because of the greater population of the northern states, and because of the
regular dominance of the Republican Party in the North, the Republican candidates captured the
popular vote in each of the elections that they won through the electoral college, with two
exceptions-1876, when Democrat Tilden won the popular vote but lost the electoral, and 1888,
when Democrat Cleveland captured the most popular votes but lost the electoral vote. See id at 6364, 71-72. In the other elections, if the Democratic candidate had done somewhat better in the
northern states, so that he captured the nationwide popular vote, he still would have lost the electoral
college unless he made major breakthroughs in the electoral vote in the North. Cleveland took the
presidency in 1884 and 1892 largely by capturing the ultimate prize, New York. Wilson broke
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Why isn't this long history cited as a dangerous example of the electoral
college's susceptibility to regional presidents? I suggest that the answer is
related to the reason why the election of 1860 is not highlighted as a bad
example-our modem disgust with southern politics before the civil rights
breakthroughs of the 1960s. The southern political culture systematically
oppressed and silenced the voices of its African American citizens. 230 We
correctly characterize southern politics before the 1960s as illegitimate. Our
scom, however, should not blind us to the evidence that the electoral college
can and did facilitate regional presidencies.
History should remind us that the electoral college may again choose a
President without any significant support across a large region of the nation.
Consider this not-too-fanciful scenario: Imagine that, in the near future,
controversies such as gay marriage and tension with Muslim culture lead to
the rise of a "traditional American family values" party. This party in fact
preaches ethnic, religious, and cultural intolerance of those who do not fit the
mold of the traditional Christian lifestyle. Under the right circumstances, and
with shrewd campaigning, this party might manage to gain pluralities in all or
nearly all of the conservative "red America" states.231 Meanwhile, in "blue
America"-meaning the West Coast, northeastern, and Great Lake states-in
which the extremist party does not even bother to campaign, it collects only a
handful of votes. Under this scenario, the extremist party could win the
presidency, even though a large majority of American voters reject it. If there
were only two parties, the extremist candidate could win, say, 60% of the vote
in the red states, but only 5% in the blue ones. If the red region encompassed
55% of the population (and about the same percentage of the electoral vote, of
course), the extremist candidate would collect less than 36% of the nationwide
3 In
total ofinmore
than23 64%
the moderate's
as compared
with popular
popular
vote, 232
history).
vote percentage
represent
the highest
(which would

another Republican streak in 1912, in part because of an unprecedented split among Republican
voters and because Wilson's antiwar message resonated especially well in the western states. See id.
at 85-87. It was only with the Great Depression that Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party
for the first time since before the Civil War broke through and captured a majority of northern voters.
See id. at 97.
230. See MORISON ET AL., supra note 85, at 726-27, 732-34 (briefly discussing the impetuses
for the civil rights era); see also Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the
Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267 (discussing the southern system of "Jim Crow" race

discrimination).
231. See David Brooks, supra note 187 (dividing the nation into "red" and "blue" Americas).
232. The extremist candidate takes 33% of the national vote from the red region (.55 times .60),
plus 2.25% from the blue region (.45 times .05), totaling 35.25%, compared to the moderate's
64.75% (100% minus 35.25%).
233. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 24-149. The record is Lyndon Johnson's 61% in
1964. See id.
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the electoral college, however, the failure of the extremist party in blue
America would make little difference, and the extremist candidate would be
elected President by a not especially close 5 5 0/- 4 5 % electoral vote majority.
If the extremist party faced opposition from two national parties, winning
might be even easier, courtesy of the electoral college and its unit voting
system. If the extremist won merely a plurality of votes (perhaps some with
only 34%) in each of the red states, he or she could collect 55% of the
electoral vote without winning a majority of votes in any state. Assuming an
average plurality of 40% in all the red states, the extremist candidate could
become President despite collecting only 22% of the nationwide popular vote,
quite possibly less than either of the losing Democratic or Republican
opponents.2 34 This disturbing scenario would merely be a repeat of 1860stretched somewhat, adapted to modem times, and without Abraham Lincoln.
In contrast to election by direct popular vote, the electoral college facilitates
the election of a regional, minority-and extremist-President.
E. DiscouragingThirdParties?
A final significant defense is that the electoral college discourages thirdparty candidates.23 5 It is claimed that the college shores up the stability, if not
the diversity, of our political system. 236 Because the two-party system has
little to do with state authority-indeed, discouraging other parties seems
rather nationalistic and uniform, rather than diverse and state-oriented-it
seems inappropriate to call two-party stability an attribute of federalism.
Nonetheless, even conceding the desirability of limiting politics to two parties
(something that would have shocked the framers of 1787237), I maintain that
the electoral college does little to discourage third-party presidential
candidates.
234. With a popular vote, an extremist, minority, third-party candidate might likewise win a
plurality with only 34%. This is why proposals for popular election often include a runoff, in which
extremist candidates are likely to fare less well than more moderate candidates. But see GUINIER,
supra note 132, at 3, 14 (criticizing extreme majoritarianism as stifling the voice of minorities). In
the electoral college system, however, the extremist candidate may win a majority of the electoral
votes without taking anywhere near a majority of popular votes, as did Lincoln in 1860. See
MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 54.

235. See BEST, supra note 1, at 207-12; HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 16-20 (arguing that the
college acts as an "electoral culling process" that discourages third-party candidates), 121-27.
236. See HARDAWAY, supranote 1, at 16.

237. As discussed above, the framers wanted to create a system that would avoid "factions" and
"cabals." One of the reasons for having the electors vote in their home state, as opposed to voting as
a group, was to discourage the creation of parties. As the television show "Survivor" reveals,
however, the desire to "team up" for political success is irresistible. See Amy K. Erickson & Porter
Anderson, Stalking Some Career Strategies in

'Survivor', CNN.coM,

http://www.cnn.com/2001/CAREER/trends/02/14/survivor/index.html.

Feb.

15,

2001,

at
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Professor Hardaway has made the two-party argument a focal point of his
defense of the electoral college. 238 A direct popular vote, it is alleged, might
push the United States in the direction of a multiparty system, which
complicates political life in many European republics. 239 The existence of
more than two viable political parties often requires unstable coalitions in the
ruling legislatures. I maintain, however, that it is not direct popular election
of the chief executive, but the parliamentary system of proportional
representation, that has been the primary impetus to the multiparty
experiences of most European republics.240
Under the proportional
representation system, each party is allocated a number of representatives in
the legislature that is equal to or somewhat less than its percentage of the
nationwide popular vote-thus, a small party that gathers 10% of the
nationwide vote is rewarded with 10% or so of the representatives in the
legislature.
By giving even small parties instant representation in the
legislature, the proportional representation system undoubtedly encourages
multiple parties to field candidates and campaign vigorously. By contrast, the
one European republic that has consistently avoided proportional
representation has been Great Britain, which, like the United States, elects its
national legislature through districts, which a candidate wins by capturing a
plurality of the vote. Because parties that do not win districts fail to receive
any representation, the district system discourages small-party challengers and
encourages two centrist parties. 241 Like the United States, Great Britain has
enjoyed in effect a two-party system for more than two hundred years,
without anything like an electoral college.
Direct popular election of the President would not be analogous to
proportional representation.
A third-party challenger for President who
collected 10% or 20% of the nationwide vote probably would get nothing for
his or her efforts.242 There might be a psychological kick to seeing one's
238. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 16-20, 121-27.
239. Professor Hardaway argued that adoption of a direct popular election of the President
might lead to the development of a multiparty system, as in many of the foreign parliamentary
democracies. See id. at 122.
240. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Revitalization of Democracy in the New Millennium, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 151, 153 (2000) (noting the prevalence of variants of the proportional
representation system in Europe); Steven Hill, ProportionalRepresentation Gives a Third Choice
(1992) (discussing the boost to third parties given by proportional representation), at
http://www.giantleap.org/envision/pr4.htm.
241. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 300 (2001)
(discussing Britain's encouragement of a two-party system through district voting and making the
plurality leader the winner, which the British confusingly call "first past the post," even though with
a plurality test there is no fixed "post" to pass).
242. Even if a 20% vote-getter were to finish second and were to deprive the leading candidate
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name on the list of popular votes recipients, similar to the thrill of seeing
one's name on the list of state popular vote-getters, but such a pleasure is a far
cry from actually winning or even influencing the election. 243 The fear of
allowing a third-party candidate on the list of popular vote-getters might be
another manifestation, I suggest, of the colored map syndrome. As television
viewers, we are used to perceiving the election in terms of getting one's party
color on the map. Winning a state gets a candidate his or her own color on the
map, but otherwise it does little per se for the candidate or party. 244 Since
Word War II, three candidates other than the Republican or Democratic
standard-bearers have won states: Strom Thurmond in 1948, Harry Byrd in
1960, and George Wallace in 1968.245 Capturing a handful of southern states
did little in terms of long-term political significance for any of them.
Instituting a direct popular vote for President would be simply using the same
procedure that we use to elect our senators, members of Congress, and state
governors and using it on a nationwide scale-whoever gets the most popular
votes wins.246
In analyzing whether a direct popular vote would encourage additional
candidates, I suggest that there are three broad and overlapping reasons to run
for President: (1) to win, (2) to influence, or (3) to enjoy. For all three, a
direct popular vote would not provide much encouragement that is not already
available under the current electoral system.
First, let me address how a third-party candidate can win the presidency.
Professor Hardaway has cogently identified the one aspect of the current
electoral system that places a potential obstacle in the way of a third-party
challenger's winning the presidency-the fact that even a strong third-party
candidate probably would have little chance of winning a House of
Representatives vote if the electoral college vote failed to give any candidate a
majority.24 7 In almost any House vote, one of the two established party
of a majority, possibly triggering a runoff vote, a third-party candidate who received only 20% of the
vote in the first election would have an extraordinarily uphill battle in trying to capture more than
50% in a runoff.
243. Professor Hardaway wrote that a third-party candidate might be encouraged by the "lure
of getting a piece of the national popular tally." HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 19. Unless the share
of the popular tally is large enough to get the candidate elected, to get him or her into a runoff, or to
affect the election in another direction, there seems to be little benefit per se to getting a share of the
national tally.
244. From the habit of viewing the election as coloring in the map, we may forget that popular
votes, including those of influential third parties, decide how the map gets colored.
245. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 109-49.
246. The one complication is, of course, whether to elect a presidential candidate who has
received a plurality (the most votes) but not a majority. I discuss runoffs in notes 251-56 and the
accompanying text.
247. The Twelfth Amendment provides that if no person receives a majority of electoral votes
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candidates would presumably prevail by virtue of holding support among a
majority of the House members. 248 Thus the Constitution's provision for a
House vote, not the electoral college per se, sets forth an obstacle to a serious
third-party challenger's election under one specific set of facts: (1) the
challenger must not have received a majority of the electoral vote; (2) the
challenger must have received enough of the vote (at least 30% or so) to have
a colorable claim to being the popular choice for President; and (3) the
challenger's party holds no power to influence the House vote.249
With a direct popular vote, by contrast, a popular third-party candidate
for President, the election shifts to the House of Representatives, which then votes state-by-state
among the top three electoral vote recipients. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
248. This is the only scenario in which a third-party challenger is significantly disadvantaged
by the current system. To understand this point in more detail, assume that a third-party challenger
gathers enough support to deprive any candidate of a majority of electoral votes (and perhaps even
capturing a plurality but not a majority of the electoral votes). The election would then move to the
House. Assuming party loyalty, the House would, in most instances, simply elect the establishedparty candidate whose party controlled the House (voting state-by-state), even if this establishedparty candidate had finished a distant third in the primary election. To give a more concrete
hypothetical, reconsider the election of 1992, in which third-party challenger Ross Perot gathered
support across the nation. Had Bill Clinton (who in fact won the electoral college) suffered
significant last-minute election setbacks, it is possible that Perot could have "won" (probably by
pluralities only) a number of states and deprived both Clinton and incumbent George H.W. Bush of a
majority of electoral votes. (In fact, Perot's 18.9% of the popular vote deprived either of a popular
vote majority; Clinton carried only 42.3% and Bush only 37.4%. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7,
at 143.) In a subsequent vote in the House, which was then dominated by the Democrats, Clinton
almost certainly would have been elected, even if Clinton had finished a distant third in both the
popular and electoral vote. (It is interesting to speculate how conservative federalists would have
responded had Clinton been elected President by the House after having carried only, say,
Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, as did Democrat George McGovern in 1972!) Because
of the reasonable assumption that a third-party candidate would find it close to impossible to gain
support among three candidates in the House, it is close to necessary under the current system for a
third-party candidate to collect an outright majority of electoral votes (and thus avoid a House
referral) in order to win.
If, however, no party controlled a majority of the House (voting state-by-state), such as might
occur if the third party had elected a number of its own representatives, the third-party candidate
might be able to win by making a deal with one of the other parties. After the 1824 House vote
among four candidates, supporters of Andrew Jackson alleged that advocates of Henry Clay agreed
to shift their votes to winner John Quincy Adams in return for Adams's naming Clay Secretary of
State. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 31.
249. Having proven his point about the obstacle facing a third-party candidate in a House vote
among three candidates, Professor Hardaway then proposed, however, to remove much of this
obstacle by amending the Constitution to require the House to choose among only the top two, not
three, electoral vote-getters. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 167 (stating that the amendment
might help resolve intrastate voting splits during the House election). If the House were limited to
only two choices that included a third-party candidate, the third-party challenger might suddenly
become popular among the members of the party whose candidate finished third and was thus
eliminated. Returning to the 1992 hypothetical, if Perot had outpolled Clinton in the electoral vote
and the Democratic-controlled House was faced with a choice between George H.W. Bush and Perot,
Democrats might well have preferred Perot to the Republican incumbent.
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might be able, under the right circumstances, to win the presidency after
collecting less than a majority of popular votes. The existence of even minor
third-party choices often deprives the established party nominees of a majority
of popular votes (indeed, no candidate won a majority of popular votes in
1992, 1996, or 2000). If the President were elected by a direct popular vote,
the Constitution would have to specify what is to be done when no candidate
captures a majority. The simplest solution is the plurality solution-whoever
gets the most votes is elected, regardless of whether the plurality is a majority.
Under the plurality method, a third-party challenger could win the election
merely by outpolling both of the established candidates, without need of a
majority and without recourse to the House of Representatives. Before such a
solution is rejected as being too friendly to third parties, however, it should be
noted that the plurality solution is followed in most elections at all levels in
the United States-from state governors to U.S. Senators and House
members. Despite the potential appeal to third-party candidates, however,
Democratic and Republican candidates still win nearly all the elections.25 °
An alternative to electing the plurality winner is to hold a runoff election
between the top two finishers. A runoff is a fairly common alternative
solution to the perceived problems of electing a plurality leader who has not
won a majority of votes and who might be disfavored by a majority of
voters. 25' The French Republic, in which there is a strong history of
multiparty politics, typically elects its President in a runoff after no candidate
has received a majority in a first vote.252 Runoffs are also used in elections for
posts such as the mayor of London, the President of Ireland, and the
Australian legislature.25 3 In the United States, runoffs are employed for
250. The 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election of third-party challenger Jesse Ventura was, of
course, the most prominent recent exception. See supra note 126.
251. It is difficult to generalize whether a third-party presidential candidate would be
encouraged by the existence of a popular vote runoff. A centrist third-party candidate might be
encouraged by the existence of a runoff (if he or she finished in the top two, a centrist third-party
choice might expect to collect support from the now-eliminated candidate on the opposite side of the
political spectrum from the other established-party candidate in the runoff), while an extremist thirdparty candidate probably would fare very poorly in a runoff. Indeed, a runoff is useful in making it
difficult to elect an extremist candidate who is unacceptable to a majority of voters, but who might
under some circumstances gather a plurality in the first vote. In fact, as I argue above, the electoral
college (which allows the election of a candidate who receives a majority of electoral votes by a
series of state pluralities) is deficient in avoiding the election of an extremist plurality-only candidate
(as Lincoln arguably was in 1860).
252. See Wikipedia, French PresidentialElection 2002, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_
presidential election%2C_2002; see also Martin Rogoff, One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and
Counting: A Sixth French Republic?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 157 (2003) (book review) (discussing
the recent politics of French presidential elections).
253. See Brian P. Marron, One Person, One Vote, Several Elections?: Instant Runoff Voting
and the Constitution, 28 VT. L. REV. 343, 343 (2004) (analyzing how runoff elections could be
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officials as diverse as the governor of Louisiana and the mayor of San
Francisco. 4 If we seek to avoid potential problems posed by frequent
runoffs in presidential elections,2 55 the Constitution could provide that the
conducted more effectively).
254. See id.; Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts
Transformed the Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960-1990, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665,
695-96 (2003) (discussing the role that runoffs may have had in discouraging the election of blacks
in southern states).
255. Professor Hardaway argued that a popular vote runoff might hold a number of drawbacks,
such as "fatiguing" an electorate in which about only 50% of potential voters go to the polls once,
much less twice. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 154. In further criticizing the proposed solution
of a runoff, Hardaway raised the specter of a presidential election with dozens of candidates, none of
whom gets more than 2% of the nationwide vote, the two leading vote-getters being extremist
candidates "Joe Hitler and Edward Mussolini," one of whom would then have to win the runoff. See
id. at 17-18. The flaw in this criticism is one of cause and effect. If party politics and coalitionbuilding were to collapse to such an extent that no candidate received more than 2% of the vote, this
would indeed pose a major problem for a direct popular vote followed by a runoff. Such a potential
problem does not, however, show that a direct popular election would cause a breakdown in the party
system. Indeed, under the current system, if no candidate gathered more than 2% of the nationwide
vote, it is unlikely that any candidate would collect a majority of electoral votes (and if one candidate
did, through a series of small plurality victories, it could easily be "Joe Hitler"). The election would
then shift to the House of Representatives. Because the House must choose from among only the top
three electoral vote-getters, under Hardaway's dozens-of-candidates scenario, the House might be
stuck, almost as easily as in a popular vote runoff, with a choice between three unpalatable choiceslet's call them Joe Hitler, Edward Mussolini, and Al Stalin. Moreover, under the unit rule of granting
all of a state's electoral votes to the state's plurality vote winner, a candidate could win all of
California's 55 electoral votes by winning, say, only a plurality of 2% of the vote. With the unit rule,
which Hardaway strongly endorsed, see id. at 100-01, the top three electoral vote-getters in a nation
of dozens of candidates would likely be the plurality winners among a handful of the largest states (a
perverse twist to the supposed protection of small states under the electoral college system!).
California, Texas, and New York might end up determining, by themselves, the three names from
whom the House then elected President. Wyoming, Vermont, and Alaska would still have the same
voting power in the House election, but the small states might have a choice among only the
candidates who have "won" the largest states.
I suggest that Hardaway's doomsday scenario-that party politics would collapse to such an
extent that the presidential popular vote is split among dozens of candidates, none of whom receives
a large percentage of the popular vote-is unlikely to occur. Before I smugly dismiss the notion
entirely, however, it is worth noting that in the last French presidential election, no candidate, not
even the incumbent and eventual winner Jacques Chirac, received as much as 20% of the vote in a
first-round vote, and that it was right-wing extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen, not the established-party
Socialist candidate, who ended up facing (and losing badly to) Chirac in a runoff. See Rogoff, supra
note 252, at 158-59. To anticipate a potential failure of party politics, a direct popular vote system
could provide that if no candidate received as much as 20 or 30% of the popular vote, then the
election would shift to the House of Representatives, as under the current system. (In United States
history, the smallest percentage of the popular vote ever received by the plurality popular vote leader
was Lincoln's 39.9% in 1860.) See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 54. However-and this is
significant-to avoid Hardaway's doomsday scenario, the House would not be constrained to choose
among the top two or three popular vote-getters. To avoid the election of an extremist (our Hitler,
Mussolini, or Stalin) and to encourage the election of a President who is acceptable to a large
percentage of the nation, the House would be free to elect whomever it desires. This would be a true
impetus to rebuilding political coalitions.
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plurality winner would be elected if he or she wins at least, say, 40% of the
vote; if 6no candidate does, the two leading vote-getters then proceed to a
25

runoff.

In sum, a direct popular election would appear to provide only a small
increase in the chance that a third-party candidate could be elected. With
appropriate provisions for a runoff, a direct popular electoral system could
guarantee that a third-party challenger could win the presidency only when, it
is roughly accurate to say, the challenger has proven to be the first choice of
the American people. 7
Next, a third-party candidate may run merely in order to influence an
election. By luring voters away from the Democrat or Republican, a third
choice can affect the election without winning it. A third-party candidate can
change the outcome (intentionally or not) under either a direct vote or the
electoral college. In 1912 former Republican Theodore Roosevelt, running as
a Progressive, effectively split the Republican vote that might otherwise have
gone to incumbent William Howard Taft, facilitating the election of Democrat
Woodrow Wilson, who won only 41.9% of the popular vote.258 The most
popular third-party candidate since 1912 was independent Ross Perot, who in
1992 drew 18.9% of the nationwide vote-a figure three times larger than the
popular vote margin of victor Bill Clinton.25 9 Had Perot not run, it is not clear
what the outcome of the popular vote, or the electoral vote, might have been.
Just as a third choice can influence the popular vote, it can swing the
electoral college as well. In 2000, for example, George W. Bush carried

256. To restrict the frequency of runoffs, I suggest the following solution (which of course
could be tinkered with in various directions): Allow the election of a plurality leader who both
gathers close to a majority of the popular votes during the primary election and who outpaces the
second-place finisher by a fair margin; if the plurality leader does not meet these requirements, hold a
runoff. To give concrete numbers, we could declare the winner to be any plurality leader who has
collected at least 40% of the popular vote and at least 3% more votes than the second-place finisher.
Thus, Clinton in 1992 (with 42.3% to Bush's 37.4%) would have won without a runoff, while Gore
and Bush (who received 48.4% and 47.9%, respectively) would have had to face each other in a
runoff. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 143, 149.
257. There are ways other than the current electoral system, moreover, to discourage thirdparty candidacies. One very direct method is to make it more difficult to get one's name on the state
ballot, such as limiting the names to candidates of parties that have received a certain percentage of
votes in the previous election. Federal case law has held that states have broad discretion in how to
create ballots, but that states may not impose overly burdensome restrictions. See, e.g., Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding that an Ohio law that imposed onerous burdens was an
unconstitutional restriction on Fourteenth Amendment and other rights); McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1 (1892) (holding that states have wide discretion in crafting election rules).
258. See MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 85-87.
259. See id. at 143. Bill Clinton's popular vote margin over George H.W. Bush was 4.9%
(42.3% to 37.4%). Id.
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Green Party candidate Ralph Nader, taking

positions to the left of Democrat Al Gore, tallied more than 97,000 votes in
Florida.26 1 While it is always difficult to predict what would have happened
had some other event not occurred, it seems reasonable to conclude that had
Nader not run the majority of his supporters would have cast their votes for
Gore, giving Gore both Florida and the presidency.262
Since World War II, the only third-party candidates to win any states-the
southern reactionaries Thurmond, Byrd, and Wallace in the civil rights era-

probably did not change the outcome of the elections because all three
presumably drew most of their support away from the eventual winners.2 63
However, if either Truman in 1948, Kennedy in 1960, or Nixon in 1968 had
dropped a few more states and lost their close elections,264 they could have
rightly blamed the third choices, just as Democrats blamed Nader, with good
reason, in 2000.265 While it is true that a third-party candidate can affect the
electoral vote only state by state, a third-party choice has fifty-one chances to
change the final electoral vote count in each election. In sum, because a third
party may readily affect or even swing a close election under either a direct
vote or in the college, there is no reason to conclude that this opportunity
would encourage more third parties to field and maintain a candidate under a
direct vote.
Finally, candidates sometimes run for President simply because it is
enjoyable to do so. To use economic lingo, some politicians get "utility" from
being in the spotlight or spreading their message, even if they do not really

id

260. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 576.
261. See id Ralph Nader won 97,488 votes in Florida, and 2,834,410 votes nationwide. See

262. See David E. Rosenbaum, Relax, Nader Advises Alarmed Democrats, but the 2000 Math
Counsels Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at Al (discussing poll that suggested that Nader
voters would have voted for Gore over Bush by more than a 3-2 margin).
263. In 1948 and 1960, the deep southern states won by Thurmond and Byrd, respectively,
were still solidly Democratic and would almost certainly have gone for Truman and Kennedy,
respectively, just as they were carried by Democrat Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956. See
MIECZKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 109-17. By 1968, however, the deep southern states almost
certainly would have voted for Republican Richard Nixon, not Wallace, just as most of these states
had bucked the national trend and voted for Republican Barry Goldwater over Johnson in 1964. See
id. at 120, 124.
264. See id. at 109, 117, 124. Had Dewey carried Ohio, Illinois, and California-all won by
Republican Dwight Eisenhower four years later he would have defeated Truman, as many had
predicted. See id. at 109. Had Nixon won only New York (or both Illinois and Texas, in which the
votes were very close), he would have defeated Kennedy in 1960. See id. at 117. Had Humphrey
taken Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin--each of which Lyndon Johnson won four years earlier-he
would have beaten Nixon in 1968. See id. at 124.
265. See, e.g., Tina Brown, A Welcome Diversionfor Democrats, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2004,
at C1 (asserting that Nader cost Gore both Florida and New Hampshire).
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expect to change the outcome. This phenomenon helped explain why, for
example, poor-drawing candidates such as Al Sharpton and Dennis Kucinich
continued their campaigns well into the Democratic primary season in 2004.
They did not stay in the race because they expected to win, but rather to
appear on television, make speeches, and rally supporters. Simply being a
candidate can generate some publicity for an extreme political viewpoint that
otherwise might be ignored by the media. This might explain why Ralph
Nader ran in both 2000 and 2004 and why the Libertarian Party now regularly
fields a candidate.266 Indeed, there were thirteen different party candidates
who ran for President and collected popular votes in the 2000 election.267
Both a direct vote and the electoral college allow a third-party challenger
to run for enjoyment or publicity. With a direct election the candidate might
get the additional kick of seeing his or her name in third place on the election
night television screens, but such a thrill would likely be short-lived, just as
the electoral votes noted on the maps for Thurmond in 1948, for Byrd in 1960,
and for Wallace in 1968 were soon forgotten.268 Depending on direct election
procedures, the collection of a certain percentage of votes might entitle the
party to benefits such as public campaign funds or automatic placement on the
ballot in the next election, but such perks would not have to be any different
from those currently available to third-party candidates under state election
laws.26 9
The best empirical tests of whether a direct election would encourage third
parties are the direct elections for members of the United States Congress and
for state governors. Neither should give third parties much hope. In the
twentieth century, only a handful of third-party challengers won election to
Congress, despite the fact that most of the 535 seats are up for election every
two years, and despite the fact that most states allow a plurality vote-getter to
win without a runoff.270 In the past half-century, the House of Representatives
has had an average of only about one third-party representative among 435

266. See Libertarian
Party, Candidates for President and Vice President, at
http://www.lp.org/organization/history/prescand.html (listing candidates since 1972).
267. See WORLD ALMANAC, supranote 6, at 576.
268. Despite having won southern states, none of these parties ran candidates in the succeeding
elections, in which voters in these states returned to the major-party candidates. See MIECZKOWSKI,
supra note 7, at 109-27.
269. If we wanted to make a small bow to federalism, national presidential law could keep
states in control of voting procedures, just as states control most of the voting rules for elections to
the U.S. Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (states choose method of election of House members),
amend. XVI (same for Senate).
270. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 66-67 (summarizing third-party members of
Congress since 1900).
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members; the Senate usually has averaged only one as well.27 ' Similarly, few
third-party candidates for governor have succeeded, even though there are
fifty times as many gubernatorial elections as presidential elections.2 72 A
survey of elections in the new century shows that relatively few third-party
candidates made an impression in either House, Senate, or state gubernatorial
races. 273 Meanwhile, a number of small parties, such as the Libertarian,
Natural Law, and Green Parties, typically run candidates for President, despite
the electoral college. 274 The popularity of third-party challengers for the
presidency may be attributed in part to the symbolism of running for
President. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence fails to show that direct
elections give much encouragement to third-party candidates.
IV. REAL AND MEAGER FEDERALISM

Now that the leading rationales for the electoral college have been
scrutinized, the following question may be answered: Where is the supposed
federalism?
Although the Constitution never uses the term, federalism is usually
defined as a "system that distributes governmental authority between state and
nation. '2 75 More specifically, federalists assert that "the national government
was designed to be one of limited powers, with central responsibilities
retained for the states. 2 76 One of the most vivid and practical definitions has
been set forth by political commentator Michael Lind, who contrasted a

271. See id As of early 2004, there were only two members of Congress who were not
Republicans or Democrats-both independents from Vermont. See id. at 56-66. Congressman
Bernard Saunders was elected as an independent, while Senator James Jeffords was elected as a
Republican but left the party in 2001. See CNN, Jeffords leaves GOP, throwing Senate control to
Democrats (May 24, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/200I/ALLPOLITICS/05/24/jeffords.senate.
272. The most notable exception was Jesse Ventura's election to the Minnesota governorship
with 37% of the vote in 1998. See CNN, Election Results, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/1998
/states/MN/G/.
It must be conceded, however, that Minnesota voters are famous for their
independence. In 2002, the Republican and Democratic gubernatorial candidates reasserted their
domination. See Minnesota Public Radio, Minnesota Top Races, at http://news.mpr.org/collections/
campaign2002/ap/results-home.shtml.
273. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at 56-71.
274. See id at 7 (giving vote totals for the various parties in the 2000 election).
275. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 149 (4th ed. 2001); see also Edward
Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1997) (defining federalism as "a system where
particular distributions of authority between a nation and its sub-units are secured by definitive rights
that the sub-units can assert against the central government").
276. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 439-40 (2002); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James
Madison) (stating that federalism includes the belief that as many decisions as possible should be
decided locally).
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federal system with a central-dominated nationalism.

277

Under federalism, he

has written, a state continues
to act as a "sovereign," and not a "mere address"
278
within the central nation.
This distinction between a sovereign and an address helps distinguish
what I call real federalism from meager federalism. When the national
government deals with states merely as administrative units, it provides a
meager form of federalism. By contrast, when the Constitution grants states
the authority to make independent choices about how to regulate society, this
is real federalism. 2 79 As I explain, today's electoral college, shorn of its
original purposes of avoiding political parties and giving power to electors,
provides only a meager federalism. I separate the justifications for the
electoral college into relational,mathematical,and strategicdefenses.
Potentially the most important federalist aspect of the electoral college is a
relational feature-the authority of states to diverge from the national norm
and to choose their own methods of selecting presidential electors. 280 For
more than a century, however, all states have followed the norm by appointing
their electors through popular vote. The Constitution's electoral system might
exhibit some real federalism if states chose alternative methods, such as
having electors appointed by the state legislature, selected by the governor, or
auctioned to the highest bidders. There is no move, however, for states to
exercise their independent authority.2 8' Moreover, none of today's leading
defenders point to this potential authority as a significant reason for retaining
the electoral college. Indeed, in light of the modem constitutional law
limiting a state's ability to conduct its own elections, 282 it is questionable
277. See Michael Lind, Do the People Rule?, WILSON Q. 44 (winter 2002).
278. See id.at 46-47.
279. Many areas of United States law offer examples of the distinction. In the Clean Water
Act, for example, states are authorized to grant permits to pollute under the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000). But the states act mostly as
conduits for national technology-based standards, determined by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, applicable to polluters across the nation. See id §§ 131 l(b), 1314 (national technology
standards). Giving states the authority to issue federally-regulated permits is an example of meager
federalism. By contrast, the Clean Water Act also gives states wide latitude in determining the
designated uses of water bodies, id. § 1313(c)(2)(A), and the numerical criteria for cleanliness under
water quality standards, id. § 1313(b)(2)(B). This is real federalism.
280. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
281. Professor Hardaway, for one, has proposed that the Constitution be amended to clarify that
a state must choose its electors through universal popular election, see HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at
164, even though state latitude in choosing electors appears to be the most prominent aspect of real
federalism in the Constitution's provisions for electing the President, and even though Hardaway
warned against altering the federalist contract of which the electoral college supposedly was a
significant part. See id. at 81-83.
282. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that states must use a one-person,
one-vote method in creating state legislative districts).
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whether a state could diverge from popular selection of its presidential
electors.
In practice, the most significant federalist aspect of today's electoral
college is mathematical. By in effect giving a candidate a bonus of two
electors for each state won, the collecting-states bonus may give small states a
slightly greater influence on the election than they would under a direct
popular vote.28 3 When an election is not close, the small bonuses make no
difference. However, when an election is very close, the bonuses may-or
may not-swing the election in favor of the candidate who has collected the
most states. Winning the bulk of the bonuses helped Bush in 2000, but failed
to elect Ford in the close campaign of 1976. This uncertainty highlights a
fault in using the bonuses as a federalist defense. Today's electoral
mathematics work without any coherence. Election by a direct popular vote
would follow a straightforward and coherent idea-the idea of direct,
majoritarian representative democracy. By contrast, the electoral college
serves today merely as a mathematical formula, without any predictability or
logic. 284 Depending on the distribution of votes across the states, the college
may or may not elect the nominee who wins the most states, and may or may
not help a candidate who does well in the small states.
Thus, the
mathematical benefit of the collecting-states bonus is meager at best.
A strategic feature of federalism supposedly arises from the fact that
parties are encouraged to organize and campaign in states as states. Because
of unit voting, candidates pay attention to state boundaries. But this aspect of
the college is not real federalism. It encourages viewing states as separate
addresses, but does not allow states to exercise independent sovereignty to
choose their own way. Moreover, the incentives of the unit voting rule
encourage candidates to ignore states in which the outcome seems fairly clear,
in favor of paying attention only to "swing" states. Direct popular election
would push a candidate to seek votes from wherever they may be found.

283. A more potent form of federalism would give each state an equal vote in the electoral
college. Indeed, the framers gave each state an equal say when the presidential vote is referred to the
House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. As I have explained, many framers expected a
House vote fairly often, but it has transpired only once, in the election of 1824. See MIECZKOWSKI,
supra note 7, at 30. None of the leading federalists whose writings I have discussed argued in favor
of expanding the one-state, one-vote principle to the college.
284. Formulas for decisionmaking are often targets of criticism. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, A
Trial Judge's Second Impression of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364
(1992) (criticizing the federal criminal sentencing guidelines); Paul Newberry, BCS to Tinker With
Formula, CINc. POST, Jan. 5, 2004 (noting criticism of the formula for choosing the teams that play
in the college football championship game).
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Finally, the electoral college does not discourage a candidate from
focusing attention only on a limited region of the nation. While a direct
popular vote would allow a President to get elected with support skewed in
favor of a large region, the troubling possibility of a regional President is even
more acute under the electoral college formula. The college allows a
President to win simply by collecting pluralities in a region encompassing a
majority of votes, while ignoring the rest of the nation. In effect the
Republican Party took advantage of this feature from Lincoln's election in
1860 until the 1960s. For federalists interested in a system that encourages a
candidate to pay attention to as many states as possible, or to the nation as a
whole, a direct popular vote would do a better job of avoiding a regional,
minority President.
Because the United States is not a pure democracy, it may be problematic
to conclude that a direct popular election would always be "better" for the
nation than our current electoral formula. But let me use metaphors of a
photograph and a drawing in order to summarize the difference. A direct vote
is like a photo, in that it captures the visage of the nation as well as can be
done. It may not be perfect, but when done right it is usually as good as we
can get. Today's electoral college, however, acts like a drawn caricature of
the desires of the American people. Depending on circumstances and the
distribution of votes, in some elections it may exaggerate the chin, the nose, or
the hair. In others, it may de-emphasize the mouth, freckles, or skin tone.
Each election gives us a new caricaturist and new uncertainty as to what the
final picture will present. There might be a good reason to choose a
caricaturist over a photograph, such as the possibility that a good caricature
may capture the "soul" or "character" of the person that the photo may not
reveal. But such reasons need to be thoroughly explained and justified before
departing from the obvious first choice for capturing a true image.
I have suggested, hardly radically, that the United States political system
holds a presumption in favor of direct popular selection of our elected
representatives. Under this presumption, the electoral college needs to be
justified. The dissolution of most of the rationales of 1787 has heightened
interest in exploring whether we should keep the odd system for electing our
President.2 85 The controversy sharpened after the 2000 election, which
showed that a divergent outcome between the popular vote and the electors
was not a nineteenth century anachronism. Federalist concerns have been
touted as the leading justification. As I have endeavored to show, however,
the defenses of federalism are at best meager. The electoral process as it
285. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 3 (arguing for dissolution of the electoral system through
a constitutional amendment).
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operates today does not provide an avenue through which states may exercise
independent sovereignty in our federal system. Accordingly, the presumption
in favor of a direct popular vote stands.
V. CONCLUSION

At a time in which proposed constitutional amendments concerning gay
marriage, flag-burning, and other human rights occupy the public debate, 286 it
seems less important to consider an amendment to provide for a direct popular
election of the President. Certainly before the election of 2000, the possibility
that the popular vote and the electoral college would disagree seemed
remote-a relic of nineteenth century politics that disappeared with top hats,
ballot boxes, and two-hour-long speeches.2 87 In the wake of the 2000
election, however, a system that gives the presidency to the winner of an
electoral formula, not the popular vote, must be defended. Federalism has
risen to the challenge. An arrangement in which the national government and
state governments each hold sovereign power, federalism has been vigorously
revived in recent years by American conservativism. 288 Federalism provides a
tempting justification for an electoral system that is an artifact of eighteenth
century intent and which recently elected a conservative Republican
President.
When scrutinized closely, however, the federalist defenses crumble. If the
United States were to adopt the more straightforward system of a direct
popular vote, as all states use to choose their governors, the United States
would lose little if anything in terms of state sovereignty. Campaigns might
change somewhat, in that candidates would focus on issues and places in

286. See, e.g., James Stemgold, Culture War Being Reshaped, Conservatives Lower
Expectations, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 29, 2004, at Al (discussing reaction to President George W. Bush's
call for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriages); Tom Parsons, Ignore Flag Burning, CHI.
TRIB., June 18, 2003, at 18 (latest attempts to make flag-burning unconstitutional);
Christopher Smith, Put Past to Rest, Hatch Says ofArnold, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 4, 2003, at A4
(Senator's proposal of a constitutional amendment to allow foreign-born persons, such as California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, to serve as President).
287. See Dave Johnson, DoublespeakDerby: Worst First, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988, at 1
(noting that at the Gettysburg Cemetery dedication in 1863, the featured speaker, Edward Everett,
spoke for two hours).
288. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (more enforcement of federalist
constraints on national regulatory power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking
down a federal gun law on the ground that the national government overstepped into regulatory
territory that belongs exclusively to the states); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of
Federalism,47 FLA. L. REV. 499 (1995); Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987) (arguing for restraints on national power). Not all conservatives
are federalists, however. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 186-87 (1990) (noting that the
"village tyrant" can be as arbitrary in abuse of his power as the national government).
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which they felt they could sway the most voters, not on "swing states."* We
might see more personal appearances in big cities of states that tend to the
extremes of the political spectrum, such as Boston and Omaha, and fewer
appearances in the cities of whichever state appears to be up for grabs at
particular points in the election. Although party organizations by state would
be unnecessary for the presidential race, the existing party structures in each
state would probably continue to be used by the presidential campaignsalbeit with some different marching instructions. None of this would
constitute a loss of federalism.
As a matter of incentives, a direct popular election would not provide
much encouragement to third parties or greater success for third-party
candidates, as long as our congressional system of districts discourages
smaller parties from having a significant say in the ongoing political debate.
Third-party challengers can and do enter the race either for publicity or to
influence the outcome, but they are unlikely to win, either under the current
system or under a direct vote. Votes for alternative candidates might often
deprive both major party candidates of a majority of the popular vote-just as
occurs on a state-by-state basis today 2 8 9-- but this can be resolved either by
electing the plurality winner, as most states do with their governors and
presidential electors, or by a runoff among the top two finishers. The
frequency of runoffs could be minimized by electing any plurality winner who
got, say, 40% of the vote and defeated the second-place finisher by more than
3%. This might seem complicated to understand, but it is not any more
convoluted than figuring out the electoral vote.
Amending the Constitution to jettison the outmoded formula of the
electoral college may not quicken the hearts of many political advocates. But
the election of 2000 rekindled a long-simmering debate, and a defense of
federalism cannot extinguish it. Electing the American President by a
straightforward direct popular vote might change little in most elections, but it
would help ensure that each American voter sees his or her input, in terms of
one vote, in the final vote tally. There could be no greater legitimacy.

289. For example, Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 despite winning the majority of
votes in only one of 50 states-his home state of Arkansas. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 6, at
577-605.
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